

CONTEMPORARY ISSUES

A MAGAZINE FOR A DEMOCRACY OF CONTENT

13

VOL. 4

NOVEMBER-DECEMBER 1952

Eastern Europe Under the Iron Heel

Robert Keller

Anti-Semitism in Eastern Europe

M. S. Shiloh

The Significance of Eisenhower

Charles Graham

Yugoslavia: Where are the Real War
Criminals?

M. S. Shiloh

Correspondence
On Anti-Semitism

Material and Documents
Germany: The Case of Johannes Neitz

CONTEMPORARY ISSUES

No. 12

The Problem of Chemicals in Food

L. Herber

The Crisis of Europe

Joseph Ramai

Material and Documents

America: The Japanese Expropriations

Tanganyika: The Wameru Evictions

For all who read German, we recommend our sister publication

DINGE DER ZEIT

Contents of No. 11, recently published:

Sondernummer:

Die Kampagne gegen die

Remilitarisierung in Deutschland

1. Gelegentlich der Kampagne:
Ein Brief und eine Antwort

Ernst Zander

Price: 2/-, 40 cents

TO OUR READERS

CONTEMPORARY ISSUES is not conducted as a profit-making concern but is supported solely by sales and the voluntary contributions of friends. We appeal to our readers to assist us by subscribing to our magazine either directly to us or through their respective bookshops and by submitting donations in the form of money, articles, reports, etc.

ber
nai

tion

der

fit-
the
our
cine
ok-
ey,



CONTEMPORARY ISSUES

Vol. 4

NOVEMBER-DECEMBER, 1952

NUMBER 13

CONTENTS

	PAGE
Eastern Europe Under the Iron Heel, by Robert Keller	2
Anti-Semitism in Eastern Europe, by M. S. Shiloh	39
The Significance of Eisenhower, by Charles Graham	51
Yugoslavia: Where Are the Real War Criminals?, by M. S. Shiloh	57
Correspondence	62
Material and Documents	
Germany: The Case of Johannes Neitz	67

Please note our new address in Britain:

Contemporary Press,
26 Heber Road,
London, N.W.2.

Subscription rates are 8s. (\$1.60) for four issues.

Published by Contemporary Press, 26 Heber Road, London, N.W.2
and 545 Fifth Avenue, New York City, 17, N.Y., as a quarterly.

Robert Keller

EASTERN EUROPE UNDER THE IRON HEEL

ON 6th January, 1944, Russian contingents under General Vatutin crossed the pre-1939 frontiers of Poland. For the first time after the German invasion, Russian armies entered the territory of an East European country and within the same year occupied the capitals of Lithuania, Rumania, Bulgaria, and Yugoslavia. This advance was carefully prepared by diplomatic negotiations of astonishing imperialist frankness between the Allied powers. Cordell Hull, wartime Secretary of State, tells us in his memoirs that as "early" as May, 1944, Lord Halifax suggested that Russia be granted a controlling influence in Rumania *if* Britain was given control of Greece. Roosevelt assented to this exchange on a three months' "trial basis" and the "deal" was subsequently completed between Britain and Russia in June, two months before Bucharest fell into Russian hands. The negotiations for influence in the Balkans were continued when Churchill and Eden arrived in Moscow in October, 1944. At this conference, Russia was granted a 75 per cent. control of Bulgaria, Hungary and Rumania, while Yugoslavia was divided "fifty-fifty" between the Kremlin and Britain! This extraordinary division of loot, of the nationhood and lives of millions of East European people — indeed, of countries whose violation by Germany was the solemn excuse for conducting the last war for "freedom" — disguises the even more fundamental fact that "percentages" of this sort could mean nothing, that Russia was consciously being given *de facto* control of Eastern Europe. Churchill's drive for a "bargain" was the last faint "rescue" operation of British interests in the Balkans. It was in reaction to, and over-ridden by, the determination of Washington to deliver the control and policing of Eastern Europe into Stalin's hands. This policy, presumably executed under the diplomatic formula of prohibiting all spheres of influence, simply meant prohibiting *England* from acquiring a share of the Balkans to manipulate in her own interests. It was followed with such energy by America that American armies were deliberately halted to permit Russia to occupy strategic areas in the East. By the winter of 1944-5 the movements of the Allied armies over Europe had ceased to be motivated in any sense by military interests. They had become entirely diplomatic. Russia's occupation of Eastern Europe was not an accident of war, a product of conjunctural military exigencies; it was the essential result of a time-table, modified by military events, which had been agreed upon between the Allied powers. As the Iron Heel of German fascism was removed, the foot-prints it left behind were occupied by the boot of Russian fascism. This was achieved with the complicity and the active assistance of

the so-called Western "democracies". The war for "freedom" had simply replaced one totalitarian tyranny by another.

The Economic Problems of Eastern Europe

As the Russian army plodded into Eastern Europe, it encountered economies on an even higher level than were to be met with in Russia proper.¹ Yet this "higher" economic area which the Russian army entered had been forced outside the essential pale of European capitalism. Indeed, as one writer has indicated, Eastern Europe "was subjugated to the rule of capitalism . . . but was never able to taste the blessings of an independent industrial development".² While England, France and Germany hewed out their bases for a bourgeois economic development, Eastern Europe lay divided among the provincial empires of Austria, Russia and Turkey. It was only when European capitalism was reaching the limits of its historical and world radiation that the Balkan peoples were beginning in some measure to free themselves from Turkish suzerainty. Even this freedom was very belated. Rumania, Serbia and Bulgaria achieved juridical independence in 1878. Others followed as late as 1913, and Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia were given independence only after the first World War. Until then, the major European powers did everything they possibly could to frustrate Balkan development. The Treaty of Berlin (1878), to which England, France, Germany and Russia were signatories, perpetuated Turkish rule in Eastern Europe over millions of restive people while dividing the "emancipated" nations into a crazy-quilt of small states and oppressed minorities. The treaties after the World War followed the same pattern, leaving Eastern Europe a boiling cauldron of economic and ethnic problems. Industrial development in Eastern Europe occurred too late for the area to find its own place in world capitalist development; it was accompanied by restrictions that pushed the whole area off on to a side road and left the economy distorted, incomplete and burdened by the domination of the West.

¹ It seems to be a common assumption that Eastern Europe, one of the most depressed areas of the continent, was on a lower economic level than Russia. Gluckstein, in his *Stalin's Satellites in Europe*, for example, states that the "average real income per head of occupied population was lower in the U.S.S.R. than in Czechoslovakia but higher than in other Eastern European countries". (p. 53.) This conclusion is arrived at by comparing the real income in Russia with other countries in the East.

Several peculiarities, however, immediately present themselves. (1) The statistics involved for Russia are based on estimates for 1937, an unusually "favorable" year for the Russian economy, while those for Hungary, Poland, Yugoslavia and Bulgaria range over 1925-1934, generally poor, depression years in Eastern Europe. (2) A comparative study of agricultural productivity is unfavorable for Russia. Gluckstein, for instance, later observes that "if the improvement in Russian agricultural production after 1931-5 is taken into account, it is clear that her output per male engaged in agriculture was not more than that of Rumania, Bulgaria or Poland, and must have been far short of Hungary or Czechoslovakia". (p. 112.) When it is considered that since 1929 slave labor has become a pillar of Russian production, that real income for 1937 can only be estimated indirectly, that "averages" for Russia have to be obtained somewhere between a slave laborer who lives on a crust of black bread and thin soup and a Stakhanovite who acquires a fairly rounded allowance — the absurdity of the "real income" comparison is obvious. With Russian society what it is, a comparison on the base of known productivity is, at best, the only possible index of relative economic levels.

² E. Zander, unpublished manuscript.

There is no mystery attached to the stifling of Eastern Europe by West European capitalism. The solution can be located in the simple fact that once one or two major capitalist countries have assumed dominant positions in the world development, every effort is turned to securing this position by pushing actual or possible rivals for predominance into a side road. Even under ascending conditions of over-all industrial growth and expansion like those which existed during the last century, this dominance was attained by side-tracking the development elsewhere. England achieved her foremost world position in the nineteenth century by driving France into a limited area of world capitalist production after two centuries of bitter conflict. German economic development could occur principally in those areas of production which England did not, and could not, occupy. In this respect, for example, Germany was favored because the development of technology opened areas of production (low grade ores, armaments, chemicals) which the older English industrial installations were not equipped to encompass. German capitalism thus found a place in the world division of labor which finally presented Germany with industrial superiority over Britain. Her belatedness gave her access to even more advanced industrial techniques, and the strategic areas of industry soon began to shift to those which she now occupied. But after the appearance of Germany and her bid for world monopoly during the first World War, the bases for development began to disappear. The internal economies of the leading capitalist countries developed into monopolistic forms. Just as the bourgeois powers began to block each other externally, domestic monopoly began to block the development internally. After the first World War, which accelerated the appearance of domestic as well as international monopoly, capitalist industrial progression which characterized the whole course of previous capitalist history slipped into stagnation.

The obstacles which world capitalism placed in the way of Eastern Europe made any appreciable development impossible without the full participation of the state in the economy. In Poland, before the last war, the state owned at least a quarter of the enterprises in the country. What is more important, this percentage was much higher in the heavy and strategic industries, reaching from 40 per cent. in financial institutions, through 50 per cent. in tool-making machinery, 70 per cent. in maritime transportation — to an absolute monopoly of production in automobiles, aircraft and radio. In Yugoslavia, state enterprises also existed over whole areas of the economy, encompassing not only the major public utilities but more than half of the lumber industry (if we include municipal holdings), 90 per cent. of the iron and coal output, and considerable portions of the sugar and cellulose industries. These two countries represent the more industrialized regions of Eastern Europe (we may omit Czechoslovakia, which actually belongs to the central European complex). The pattern was followed on a diminishing scale among the remaining countries as we approach regions that are almost entirely agrarian.

The extent of industrial "nationalization" in Eastern Europe, then, occurred for reasons which obviously derive not from social forces alien to capitalism *but from the character of the world capitalist development itself*. The countries of Eastern Europe were compelled to turn to state enterprise precisely to the degree that they could participate in world capitalist

industry. State enterprises comprised the form in which capital was exported from the West to the East. They remained the form in which all the features of the modern capitalist economy — exchange, exploitation and capital accumulation — existed and found expression. The nationalized sector, the most decisive in Eastern Europe, reflected no more than the limiting conditions imposed by world bourgeois development on industrially backward countries. It represented the only channel, after others had been closed, by which the *bourgeois* development in Eastern Europe could proceed. Correspondingly, as similar obstacles were developed in the relations between the older capitalist powers, as each major power began to stand in the way of the other in Western Europe, state controls and nationalization were needed to collect the forces for rivalry and domination. In Eastern Europe, the state enterprises became the precondition for bourgeois existence; in Western Europe, to-day, they also are becoming the precondition for bourgeois existence in a period when all the obstacles to a rounded industrial development have grown more formidable among the traditional capitalist countries. Thus Eastern Europe, like Russia, does not comprise a point of departure from capitalism, but simply mirrors the course of capitalist development, of its turn toward senility and decline.

For Eastern Europe, the limits imposed on the extension of industry have become a source of profound social and economic crisis. This is a fact which cannot be too strongly emphasized. It demonstrates in real life the scope of the bourgeois mode of production, indeed, its incapacity historically to meet the problems of society after a brief period of revolutionary economic development. In the East, these social problems are cast in terms of population and the relationship of agriculture to industry. A cursory view of population statistics in the area suggests that the average density of population compares very favorably with that of Western Europe. Moreover, statistics on the distribution of land show that until the last war, the area was one of small peasant holdings. The large estates in the Balkans were broken up in two successive periods — first, in the last century when the Turks partly withdrew from Europe and again after the first World War, when the danger and actual fact of revolution led to land reforms in Yugoslavia, Rumania, to a small degree in Poland and during the 'twenties in Bulgaria. Curiously enough, large estates were preserved in Hungary because the Bela Kun "soviet" government, in the expectation of large-scale "socialist" (collective) farming, persistently refused to give the land to the peasants. Poland also remained a country of large estates, despite legislation which theoretically fixed holdings at an average of 180 hectares of arable land.

But this is not to say that in Eastern Europe the social distribution of the land has not remained a radical problem, especially since Russia has taken over the area. The point is that a related and even more fundamental problem arises when consideration is given to the capital allocated to food cultivation. It is of extraordinary significance that the average value of implements employed per hectare of land is estimated at around \$8 for Poland, \$5 for Bulgaria and as little as \$3 for Rumania! This compares with \$165-170 in Switzerland, where agriculture is carried on according to the most rationalized standards of West European food production. A corresponding situation exists in other aspects of cultivation and output.

The quantity of fertilizer brought to the soil and the amount of livestock on the land is very small as compared with the situation in Western Europe. The result is that agricultural output per hectare of farm land in the East has remained the smallest on the continent, despite the famous Danubian plain which is among the most fertile areas of the world and probably was the traditional source of agricultural practices in Europe. On the whole, output is a third and often less, hectare for hectare, of agricultural production in the West.

The same disparity separates the superficial demographic parallels between West and East. The economic crisis of Eastern Europe can be summed up as a decisive scarcity of capital, a scarcity that underlies all the convulsive difficulties and conflicts of the area. From this perspective, the density of population admits of only illusory comparison with the countries along the Atlantic seaboard. While Western and Central Europe has absorbed the bulk of its population into industry and commerce, the East, and especially the Balkans, remains an area with very few large cities and few industrial facilities. At least 25 per cent. of the population in the East is regarded as "surplus" according to modern capitalist norms, and if agricultural practices were raised to West European standards, this "surplus", it is estimated, would increase to 50 per cent. In the absence of industry, in the absence of those precious capital resources which the Western world and especially America is so lavishly giving for destructive armaments, Eastern Europe remains in a hopeless *cul de sac*. Within this framework no other conceivable solution remains possible. As Ygaël Gluckstein observes in his *Stalin's Satellites in Europe*:

"An examination of the economic situation of the countries of Eastern and South-Eastern Europe will make it obvious that no redistribution of the national income and wealth will by itself radically improve the condition of the people . . . [If] the total agricultural land of the countries (and not, as has been the case, merely the large estates) were distributed equally among the peasants, the main result would be the equalization of poverty. As long as the majority of the people are engaged in agriculture and the productivity of labour in agriculture is as low as it is to-day, no real improvement of their condition is possible."

The Social Crisis in Eastern Europe

The limitations of this development placed a fatal seal on the social antagonisms of Eastern Europe, keeping the entire half of the continent in acute political crisis. This is exemplified by the degeneration of most of the peasant movements from organizations which once professed to champion the general needs of the countryside into organized parties, wedded to the narrow well-to-do peasant strata and guided in foreign policy by the West or Central European country that was the most important market for their agricultural produce. The high-point of these movements appeared directly after the first World War, when peasant party régimes were established in Bulgaria and Rumania. The overthrow of Stambuilsky's peasant government in Bulgaria (1923) may be regarded as a turning point not only for the peasant parties of the Balkans but for the parliamentary régimes of Eastern Europe. Thereafter followed a series of bonapartist military dictatorships

(also very unstable) which, without exception, unseated the feeble "democratic" governments that issued out of the war. The peasant parties essentially adapted themselves to these régimes and often occupied positions in the bureaucratic framework. In theory, these parties were committed to opposition to the more extreme malpractices of the bonapartist régimes; indeed, in Poland, the peasant party combined with the socialists to lead a peasants' strike against the government only two years before the German invasion of 1939. But for all practical purposes most of these movements were limited by the general situation, by the inescapable steel vise that held Eastern Europe from generalized poverty on one side and industrialization on the other.

To complicate the social scene still further, every country from the Baltic to the Black Sea had been pasted together with sizeable national minorities. A third of the pre-war population of Poland was non-Polish, including more than four million Ukrainians, some three million Jews and almost a million Germans. The Pilsudski government did not hesitate to undertake a vicious policy of "polonization" against the Ukrainians, as a result of which virtual civil war existed by 1931 in eastern Poland. The government's treatment of the Jews remained tacitly anti-Semitic. The history of Poland between the two wars was spotted with pogroms, maltreatment of minorities and a refusal to grant these groups any social recognition equal to the rights of the ethnic majority, still less rights of their own.

Yugoslavia, like Czechoslovakia, was simply a composite nation, almost equally divided between Serbs and non-Serbs, of which 37 per cent. were Croats. Although the Serbs and Croats are very closely allied in origin and language, their differences were crystallized very sharply after the first World War along national-political lines. A brief period of *rapprochement* in 1925 was followed by the assassination of the Croat leader, Radich. The Croat deputies walked out of the National Assembly in a body and, soon after, the parliamentary régime collapsed. Thereafter, Yugoslavia was ruled by a Bonapartist-monarchist apparatus, an unstable state that feebly edified a smouldering volcano of deep economic and national antagonisms. Poland and Yugoslavia exemplify in sharp form problems that existed in every East European country before the last war. Macedonian irredentism loomed large in the tri-frontier corner that joined Greece and Yugoslavia to Bulgaria; Hungarian and Rumanian communities existed on both sides of the borders of Hungary and Rumania; German minorities were rooted in virtually every Eastern country between the Danube and the Baltic region; Jewish communities were ubiquitous, and generally suffered cruel discrimination at the hands of the Eastern governments and the local populations. That wide grants of national autonomy and a system of bi-national states were needed remained clear in the eyes of the more progressive Balkan political tendencies. But this was contingent in the last analysis on the economic setting of Eastern Europe. In Poland and Hungary, a land redistribution was still of pressing importance, especially in Poland where industry was more advanced than in the rest of Eastern Europe. This was never achieved. The Polish governments under Pilsudski and those which followed him up to the last war remained as narrow, oppressive and bigoted as those of the other states of the area.

The second possible line of development rested in wide measures of

economic co-operation within the East European area. Perhaps the most promising development in this direction occurred when Stambuilsky attempted to federate the peasant parties of the Balkans into a regional movement for Balkan co-operation. The theme recurred again and again during the 'thirties, but after Stambuilsky's assassination in 1923 it lost its vitality with the degeneration of the peasant parties. In the 'thirties, these organizations consciously surrendered whatever contact they retained with the popular objectives of the peasantry, and exchanged their ideas of an "agrarian democracy" for compliance to the bonapartist régimes.

The idea of Balkan solidarity became instead a device in the hands of the various East European states to juggle the frontier and minorities' questions. A Balkan conference was called in October, 1930, in which unofficial representatives of all the countries of the area participated. Four conferences followed between 1930 and 1934. The character of all these conferences is revealed and their pretensions exploded by the fact that the second conference began to flounder on the Macedonian issue and the suppression of the IMRO (Macedonian Revolutionary Organization). Bulgaria, the moving power behind Macedonian irredentism during these years, withdrew from the conference because she refused to take action against the organization, i.e. refused to accept the territorial *status quo*. For all practical purposes, all of these conferences went no further than the minorities question. The Balkan Pact of 1934, the point of culmination of these conferences, and which brought them to an end, was simply an agreement between the important Balkan powers to freeze the national minorities in each country with their given status, to perpetuate, in short, the decades of national oppression that were etched into contemporary Balkan history.

In Western Europe, economic unity and homogeneity had been achieved by the bourgeoisie. In Eastern Europe, the bourgeoisie was insignificant. It remained indecisively tied to the bonapartist state, with its baggage of oppressed minorities and social distinctions by which the particularized system of parasitism and extremes in wealth circumvented the illusory "agrarian democracy" of generalized poverty. The Liberal Party, led by the Bratianu brothers, made one of the few attempts to advance essentially bourgeois interests in Rumania. After taking power in 1922, it characteristically tried to graft a greater measure of centralization on parliamentarism. Its economic policy, curiously enough from the standpoint of those who see in state property some form of new or non-capitalist direction, was oriented toward the nationalization of the forests and mines. But the Liberals floundered on the inner poverty of the Rumanian development. Their policies became contradictory and dichotomous: trying to digest newly acquired minorities in a parliamentary "democracy", opposing the importation of foreign capital in the interests of the domestic bourgeoisie and suffering from a drastic shortage of capital resources, endeavoring to achieve self-sufficiency while trying to overcome the tariff barriers around their earlier markets in Austria and Hungary. The knives that cleaved their policies in two were legion. The problems of the country could not be made to fuse with an independent development along bourgeois lines . . . and the Liberals were replaced by the Peasant party in 1928.

With the exception of the Polish Socialist Party and the Jewish Bund, the labor movement in the rest of Eastern Europe remained weak and

insignificant, never emerging from illegality or semi-illegality. This, too, reflected not only the weight of industry in the East, but it also mirrored all the contradictions of the development. Just as Eastern Europe signalled the decline of capitalism on the European continent with its state economy sectors and bureaucratic military dictatorships, so the oncreeping paralysis of Stalinism in Russia found its first echo in the Communist Parties of the Balkans. The "neutrality" of the Bulgarian Communist Party in the Zankov reaction against Stamboulsky (September, 1923) represents one of the earliest and most flagrant examples of treachery in the degeneration of the Third International. This was followed by a typical Stalinist "counter-action" when the Estonian Communist Party staged a putsch with 227 armed men in the morning of 1st December, 1924. It was Balkan leaders like Kolaroff who first declared that no defeats were being suffered by the labor movement while Bulgarian Communists were being butchered in Sofia — a "tactic" that was to reach its height after Hitler crushed the German labor movement in 1933.

Thus Eastern Europe moved toward the war years, turning feverishly in a mounting world crisis. The bonapartist régimes rose and fell with the same irresoluteness and incapacity to solve problems as the parliamentary régimes that preceded them. Yet the very contradictions of Eastern Europe that cancelled out the basis for a progressive development, also cancelled out the basis for a totalitarian *Gleichschaltung*. The interests of the various strata were too divergent to permit any lasting combination of forces for an authentic fascist movement. The resources for a powerful reaction were dissipated in the complex maze of problems that reached from the summits of the state bureaucracy with its differentiations into army, monarchy and constitutional parties, to the interests of numerous, often discrete, national minorities. Instability remained chronic in the absence of sufficiently strong forces to resolve the contradictions one way or another. In short, Eastern Europe was a powder-keg that could not be "neutralized" or "stabilized" on its own forces. The sputtering of the whole area, which awaited a revolutionary stimulus or perspective from the West to explode, had to be settled "once and for all" by world capitalism. The revolutionary stimulus did not come during the 'thirties. Instead, appeared the German and Russian *Gleichschaltung* — the Iron Heel that levelled out and crushed underfoot every possibility for development.

Drang Nach Osten — and Return

Between the two World Wars, Eastern Europe was the arena of shifting power relations among the major imperialist countries of the West. All of these changes, giving hegemony to one power after another, pushing the area in different directions, reflected the instability of Western Europe. Germany alone was the "natural" axis for an East European development. As a highly industrialized country, situated directly in the heart of Europe, she was most equipped to meet the continental division of labor which could supply the East with industrial and capital goods for agricultural commodities. Indeed, the Germanic countries had been the harbingers of civilization in Eastern Europe far into the Middle Ages. The pattern, with all its limitations, was fixed in the Austro-Hungarian Empire, where Austria produced industrial products while Hungary became a granary. In the

1870's, four-fifths of Serbian exports went to the Dual Monarchy. The rest of East European exports and imports were more distributed, but Germany and Austria remained the fulcrum of East European trade.

The first World War completely upset these ties, and Balkan hegemony formally fell to France with the establishment of the Little Entente. This yielded an absurdly artificial situation. France, a country *par excellence* of petty bourgeois enterprise and small peasant holdings, was entirely incapable of meeting East European economic needs, either as an importer of agricultural produce or as an exporter of industrial commodities. The post-war relations in the East gave rise to a strictly political and diplomatic façade. Its principal purpose was to stem the tide of revolutionary Russia and to keep German imperialism in balance. This structure was so brittle that in the very year the Entente was agreed upon (1926), Italy, a second-rate industrial power, already began to undermine whatever foundations it had by economic penetration into the Balkans.

The Balkan Entente, however, was also nourished by the fear (which prevailed throughout Eastern Europe) that the hegemony of a large capitalist country in Middle Europe no longer was capable of promoting any development whatever in the East. The governments of the area were familiar with the implications of the *Mittel Europa* scheme with which German imperialists flirted during the first and (in its characteristic retrogressive form) on the eve of the second World War. They justifiably recognized that direct German control in the East could only mean a species of outright parasitism, an exploitation of catastrophic proportions that would push the entire area back into darkness. The same fear prevailed even more strongly with respect to Stalinist Russia. Nonetheless, the objective economic conditions again pushed Germany into prominence in the East, especially with the resurgence of the German economy under Hitler's war program and the general economic difficulties in the rest of the world. When viewed from the standpoint of Balkan exports, the proportion of goods for which Germany provided a market in the 'thirties was enormous. In 1939, Bulgaria sent as much as 80 per cent. of her export goods to Germany, and South Eastern Europe almost half of her produce. Correspondingly, the area met 45 per cent. of its imports from German production. Countries like Yugoslavia and Greece, with outlets to the Mediterranean Sea, sold a larger proportion of their goods to the West; Yugoslavian exports to England and France, in the first quarter of 1940, reached 47 per cent. Access to English industrial products and assistance, during the war years, was to prove one of the principal modifying factors in Balkan policy.

It was this fear of German imperialism that gave to the Balkans a considerable independence of policy after the outbreak of the second World War. Until the Balkans were almost totally occupied by German troops to arrest the movement of the Russian army, a curious juridical pattern prevailed throughout South Eastern Europe. The Hungarian government under von Kallay, for example, while serving reactionary ends in every respect and giving the German war effort direct material assistance, persisted in internal policies that were by no means in accord with the German *Gleichschaltung*. As a result, German occupation was directly preceded by a new cabinet under Sztojay in March, 1944. The entry of Russian troops into Transylvania caused a shift back to a military caretaker cabinet under

General Lakatos, which was inimical to German interests. Finally, this cabinet had to be overthrown by Ferenc Szalasi, the leader of the "Arrow Cross", a Nazi-inspired movement in Hungary. It is a fact that authentic "Germanophiles" were never able to acquire control over the Hungarian government until after the crumbling of the state under direct German and Russian occupation.

A similar situation prevailed in Rumania, where characteristically pro-German movements like the "Iron Guard" never assumed state control and, in fact, were restricted in their attempts to promote a closer merging of interests with the Nazis. Although Antonescu assumed the rôle of a personal *confidante* of Hitler, the Antonescu government maintained a sufficient leeway of initiative actually to try to make contact with the Allies in 1944, under the very noses and bayonets of the Germans. Horia Sima, the leader of the "Iron Guard", found himself in the ludicrous position of taking refuge in Germany while the Rumanian government was still officially allied to the German eastern bloc. In Bulgaria it also proved to be impossible to form a "Germanophile" government; indeed, the Germans never succeeded in bringing the country into war against Russia. An index, perhaps, is the over-all failure of German anti-Semitic policies to achieve "fruition" in these countries. Although all three nations passed sharp legislation and conducted pogroms against their Jewish communities, these communities remained intact until either German or Russian troops entered their territories. In Rumania and Bulgaria, the Jewish community survived. Wholesale deportations were to occur only after the Stalinist "Peoples' Democracies" were established. What the Germans could not succeed in doing in Rumania and Bulgaria after six years of warfare and in a part of a continent that they completely surrounded and partly occupied with military forces, the Russians managed to initiate three years after the war came to an end.

With the possible exception of Yugoslavia, German economic penetration succeeded only to the same degree that it controlled the countries of Eastern Europe. In Poland and Czechoslovakia, where political control was direct, the most strategic areas of the economy were virtually completely "Germanized". Czech banks were merged into four large financial structures, and more than half of the capital investment was acquired by the "Creditanstalt", "Dresdner" and "Deutsche" Banks. Polish banking capital was almost entirely absorbed by the so-called "Ostbank A.G.", a subsidiary of the "Dresdner Bank". Control of the Czech steel industry was parcelled out between the "Herman Goering Werke", Slovakian foundry interests and "Skoda". Gluckstein estimates that German interests thus acquired 60 per cent. of Czech industry and almost 100 per cent. of the banking and financial institutions. German acquisitions in Poland went even further, running the entire gamut of the economy from extraction industries to finance, and including many small-scale handicraft properties. The S.S., in this country, had a "field day", to use an American colloquialism. "By April, 1942 [writes Sharp] not less than 230,000 Polish industrial and commercial enterprises of all sizes were reported Germanized in the annexed part of Poland."

In Hungary, on the other hand, a large proportion of German capital investment occurred as a result of building up the newly-developed oil and

aluminium industries for war purposes. These and other interests put a third of Hungarian industry under German control. German penetration into Rumania consisted principally of "buying up" the Allied capital interests already in the country. Economic control particularly centred on the oil industry, which provided the Germans with their principal sources of natural petroleum. Bulgaria saw the least amount of German penetration, partly because of the dearth of industry, but also because she was less directly influenced by the Nazis.

When it is considered that a large proportion of the industries in Eastern Europe were developed by foreign capital, German penetration was not as considerable as it ordinarily seems to be. What is, in fact, striking in the Balkans is the comparatively slight degree to which the Germans exercised their potentialities for social domination and economic control. It may be well to compare the amount of foreign to German capital in this area. In Rumania, for example, where foreign capital investment occupied 80 per cent. of the Rumanian economy, one sixth of the economy was in German hands. This pattern was continued in most of the Balkans, which simply means that whole areas of investment which belonged to the Allies were left untouched. Even in Yugoslavia, where foreign investment reached as much as 78 per cent. of mining, 91 per cent. of metallurgy and more than half of the metal processing industry, German investment in Serbia and Croatia probably did not exceed 80 million dollars under the occupation. The expropriations reached their height in the Balkans when industries were dismantled on a huge scale before the advancing Russian line.

Whether it was because of the war and military exigencies, or because German fascism for all its bestiality still retained some of the cautious techniques of the past — in Rumania, Hungary and Bulgaria, at least, their methods differed appreciably from those employed in Poland, and were sharply to contrast with those employed by the Russians. To the Balkan peoples, the Germans were the portent of the terrible disaster which world capitalism produced for countries whose misfortune it was to appear belatedly on the curve of bourgeois development. The entry of the Russian army was the disaster itself, a *Gleichschaltung*, a levelling, that bears comparison with the activities of the Kremlin in Russia during the years of collectivization, when Stalin applied the sword and torch to the countryside.

The Russian Army in Eastern Europe

As the Russian army entered the Balkans, it gave way to an orgy of looting, banditry and expropriations that defies any precedent in the behaviour of a *modern* army. Entire divisions came to resemble gypsy baggage trains. With his rifle in hand and bayonet at his side, the Russian soldier reproduced in Eastern Europe the same anarchic, individual pursuit to advance his long unsatisfied material needs that explains the past three decades of Russian economic life — planned and nationalized economy or not. Military discipline gave way to what Stalinist propaganda feebly attempted to describe as "revenge" against the "fascist oppressor". Actually, the "oppressor" in these instances was simply the population of Eastern Europe, without a glimmer of social distinctions between wealthy and poor, bourgeois or laborer. The army of Stalinist Russia appeared on the continent of Europe like a plague of locusts, as elemental as a force of

nature, and neither the police divisions of the MVD nor the regaled guards' divisions were able to confine the tide.

After the capture of Budapest and Bucharest, soldiers strayed through the streets seizing wristwatches and jewelry from passers-by; they entered homes and not only expropriated moveable valuables, but even tore up the parquet floors, tiles and removed bulky furniture. The ordinary soldiers and officers who plundered the cities were immediately followed by official commissions which began to seize needed capital goods and transport. These seizures occurred quite independently of reparations claims which the Russians were to make at Allied conferences. Budapest, which had been hotly contested between the two armies and suffered considerable destruction, was stripped bare by its "liberators". The plunderous activities of the Russian army and the Stalinist régime left the city in destitution.

The greatest problem which the Russian régime faced in the East, one which even surpassed that of the discipline and morale of its own armies, was the initiative of the masses in the cities of Eastern Europe. Whereas in Budapest and Bucharest, the fairly rapid transfer from German to Russian hands left the people of these cities stupefied and dazed by the movement of events and completely unprepared for action of their own, utterly at the mercy of the Russian army — elsewhere, in Warsaw and Sofia, for instance, the situation was different. Bulgaria was too remote from the Germans to feel the weight of their repressive measures; the country, except for certain token gestures, was essentially left to itself where a "normal" political development could continue. The country gathered its energies into an opposition of significant proportions, and as the Russians neared Sofia mass demonstrations occurred, local councils sprang up and assumed administrative functions, the police were disarmed and replaced by a popular militia. The Russians regarded these manifestations with extreme alarm. The Communist Party was ordered immediately to restrain the initiative of the masses. The Fatherland Front took rapid steps to institutionalize the situation and remove all the prerogatives of power from the populace. Military hangmen like Georgiev, who participated in the overthrow of Stambuilsky, were placed at the head of the new government with extensive repressive powers. The local Stalinists issued warning after warning to "extremists" who had any illusions that a new or improved social system had come to Bulgaria. When all else failed, the repressive machinery was put into operation. Unknown thousands perished at the hands of the new régime, including many hopeful and naïve individuals who had raised red flags over public buildings to greet the coming of a "socialist" régime.

The mass movement that the Stalinists feared more than all others existed in Poland. The barbarous activities of the General Government under Hans Frank and the S.S. had raised an uncontrollable tide of hatred and national sentiment from the traditionally militant Polish masses. This tide rapidly crystallized into the most significant underground movement in Europe — what Jan Karski has appropriately called a "Secret State". The ramifications of this illegal power were enormous. A separate system of organized power, directly affecting the lives of millions, corroded the German administration of the country. The underground, based on the collaboration of the parties of pre-war Poland, kept several daily newspapers in operation. It established its own militias, kept educational and welfare

institutions going, covered the country with a network of agents and saboteurs, penetrated into all recesses of the General Government, sent its couriers at the height of the German occupation of Europe to England, freely supplied papers and identification to its supporters, kept rest homes for its fatigued activists — most of these not in areas freed from the Germans, but in the cities, directly under the noses of the occupation authorities. In a country that swarmed with S.S. and Gestapo men, that was crossed and re-crossed by German divisions to and from the Russian front, the Polish underground turned the General Government into a mockery. While Hans Frank attempted to manipulate the affairs of the Polish people, they answered only to the leadership of the underground movement. Despite all its brutality, the General Government was reduced to the caricature of a state apparatus.

The crushing of this underground, brutally and relentlessly, was a precondition for the Russian occupation of Poland. The experiences of the Germans made it clear that this could only be done in one way — by treachery, by a virtually unprecedented betrayal. The Stalinists recognized in Warsaw the hub of the Polish underground and were determined to handle the city according to the techniques they had so carefully perfected during the Spanish Civil War. When one is mindful of the betrayal of Teruel to Franco for purely political reasons, there should be little reason for doubting the plans that lay behind the sudden stopping of Rokossovsky's armies before Warsaw. The Russians lured the underground out of hiding as they neared the city and left it exposed to the much superior German military machine without a gesture of serious assistance.

The betrayal of Warsaw falls into two phases: the events from July to 14th September, 1944, when the betrayal seemed to be mixed with military considerations, and the unmistakable treachery between September and February, 1945.

The Russian army approached the suburbs of Warsaw in the summer of 1944. As the Russians neared the city, the Germans began hastily to prepare their departure. "The Germans were evacuating Warsaw at high speed. Railway installations and industrial plants were dismantled and removed. . . . All the German offices in the city, including the Post Office, closed down. Newspapers published by the Germans ceased. The Gestapo burned documents in the greatest haste and prepared to decamp . . . German civilians besieged the railway stations. On account of the inadequate number of trains, they fled by all possible means of transport, offering sky-high prices for the hire of a horse and cart."

The so-called "Union of Polish Patriots", a Stalinist outfit established to counteract the underground, began to make appeals for an immediate uprising to facilitate the capture of the city. On 29th and 30th July, two appeals came from the Stalinists over *Radio Moscow* and *Radio Kosciuszko*, calling the people of Warsaw to arms. The populace of the city received assurance that Warsaw was on the verge of occupation, that any uprising was supplementing a determined military effort by the Russian army to seize the capital. At the outset, the Poles refused to give the Germans any co-operation. When the German military authorities "ordered the mobilization of 100,000 Poles for the fortification of the suburbs of Warsaw . . .

* T. Bor-Komorowski, *The Secret Army*, London, 1950, p. 206.

not a single Pole presented himself".⁴ The situation grew increasingly tense. By the end of the month it was apparent that the Germans were conducting a rearguard action, covering the withdrawal of their troops by holding the bridges in Praga. On 31st July, Russian patrols advanced to the Praga, and the battle of Warsaw had presumably begun.

The next day, on 1st August, 1944, the population of Warsaw rose against the Germans. To a man, the entire population turned on the occupation authorities with weapons that were mainly home-made, and in three days of bitter fighting captured the greater part of the city. During the uprising, the Germans counter-attacked the Russian army on the eastern and north-eastern fronts, driving it back about fifty miles from the city. But fifteen miles south-east of Warsaw, the Russian army held on and remained within easy striking distance of the city.

For more than a month, the Germans bombed Warsaw and threw their forces against the population, narrowing the hold which the people held over the city. Appeals for military aid, including a direct plea to Stalin from a Russian intelligence officer in Warsaw, remained unanswered. Requests by the Allies for an aerial shuttle service to Warsaw, a purely formal gesture, were refused although the same service had been granted for the bombardment of the Rumanian oil fields and East German cities. Supplies were dropped by the Russians only in mid-September, when they resumed their advance into the Praga suburbs. By the 17th, the entire Praga was cleared of Germans and the Russians were firmly lodged in the outskirts of the city.

Then the Russians halted. Their aircraft was withdrawn and their artillery was silenced. The Germans now resumed the battle of Warsaw — not against the Russian army, but against the population of the city. For a whole month, the Russian army stood by idly while the cream of the Polish underground, the most dedicated elements of the socialist and democratic movement, the intelligentsia and youth of the city were systematically decimated. The leaders and military of Stalinist Russia not only failed to lift a finger to aid the insurgents whom they lured into battle against the "common Hitlerite foe", but they went so far as to arrest thousands of Polish guerillas who raced toward the Russian lines to support their comrades in the capital. Instead of finding their way to Warsaw, an estimated 50,000 were deported to Siberia. When the smoke of the carnage lifted, a quarter of a million inhabitants of Warsaw had perished in the sixty-three-day struggle of the uprising and well over a half-million people were transported from the city for slave labor. Warsaw was destroyed building by building and street by street. Although the city had been the first European capital to be reached by the Russian Army (July, 1944), it was among the last to be occupied (February, 1945). Only Budapest, among the East European cities, fell shortly afterward. Fully five months had elapsed between the Russian attack on Warsaw and its occupation.

The Stalinist parrots abroad have spared no effort to bury the rôle of the Russian army before the Polish capital. These efforts have been so contradictory that while one Stalinoid describes the leadership of the uprising as "reactionary", another laments that aid was a physical impossibility prevented by the German occupation of the city. Both explanations

⁴ Gluckstein, *op. cit.*, p. 144.

have been conclusively demonstrated by Gluckstein to be patent lies.⁵ Aside from the fact that Warsaw simply lay at the feet of the Russian army after September, 1944, the counter-thrust of the Germans, which pushed a part of this army back a month earlier, does not excuse the behaviour of the Russians. Although Warsaw never was more than fifteen miles away from Rokossovsky's forces at any time after July, the Russians gave no aid to the Poles while much of the capital was still in the hands of the insurgents. Some measure of aid came only when the Russians were completing their occupation of the Praga, that is, when Polish control of the city had diminished considerably.

To add insult to injury, while Polish forces were being destroyed in Warsaw during the autumn of 1944, Russian reserves and the weight of the Stalinist military effort were callously diverted to South Eastern Europe. The front in Poland was relatively quiet. During the very months that Warsaw was pleading for assistance and support, the Russian army occupied Bucharest, Sofia and Belgrade. Warsaw proved to be the hinge on which the Russian military machine turned from North Eastern Europe to the Balkans.

The next sweeping act of devastation that accompanied the Russian army occurred as it entered Eastern Germany. The soldier of the Stalinist armies in this area became so identified with looting and plunder that German slang in the East and among the refugees identifies the Russians with "watches". Valtin, in his last novel, describes in some measure the holocaust that descended upon these German communities, the wholesale murders and rapes, thefts and plunder that swept across the country. By the time this army reached the cities of Prussia and Silesia, it had become a horde of bandits. The story has still to be told in detail, but it has been well sketched in a report which appeared in *Partisan Review* (March, 1948). The author, a former major in a Guards' regiment of the Russian Army, states: "Such slogans as 'When you see a German, kill him', supplied the ideological justification for the perpetration of absolutely monstrous crimes, most of them sexual, against the local population. The invasion routes were strewn with barbarously mutilated corpses of women. Multiple rape reached mass proportions; the junior officers not only failed to restrain their subordinates, but very often participated in the orgies, and sometimes instigated them. Looting of towns was often accompanied by arson, and many places (such as Landsberg on the Warta, and Stolp and Lauenburg in Pomerania) were destroyed not during but after the fighting. . . .

"It is no exaggeration to say that this army can hardly be considered an effective fighting force."

Thus, the Russian army entered into Eastern Europe.

Russian Policy in Eastern Europe

Decades of Stalinist barbarism, preceded by centuries of Czarist rule, have left the Russian soldier a brutalized being. This, coupled with the stupidities, miscalculations, material shortages (e.g., oil) and political policies of the Nazis, accounts for the defeats to which the German army was exposed in Russia. After Hitler completely strangled whatever hopes the national

⁵ Also see *Politics*, October, 1944.

groups and peasants had for relief from national oppression and rural collectivization, the Russian soldier was "reconciled" to the discipline of his native knout. This means simply that between Stalinism and Hitlerism, indeed, an aroused German fascism that behaved with a brutality in Russia that contrasts with its cautious operations in the West, no alternative was left to the Russian people. On the snow-swept plains of this vast country, brutalization became a military asset.⁴ While the German soldier required civilized rations and huddled around fires during the winter, the Russian was "supplied" with raw food which he had to prepare by himself. He lived off the countryside for his principal essentials, and attacked in blinding snow and paralyzing cold. Russian logistics were virtually non-existent. A recent study of how the Kremlin supplied its troops reaches back to military techniques of the distant past. Russian commanders did not requisition supplies; they simply commandeered the first ammunition-laden truck that came their way. On this basis, the army moved forward, ransacking its own countryside as well as foreign ones.

The depredation of the Russian land by the Russian soldier was not a serious problem to the Kremlin. There was very little to take in any case, especially after the Germans had combed the territory under their occupation. But when the Russian soldier reached more developed areas, although backward and depressed as compared with Western Europe, a real crisis developed in the Stalinist system. This crisis already raised its head as early as the partition of Poland, in September, 1939. Although Russian soldiers and officers only saw the Eastern (i.e., the most poverty-stricken) regions of the country, they were fascinated by the commodities for sale in the local shops. The bulk of the army indulged in a huge buying spree,

⁴ Another legend deserves notice here: that Hitler underestimated Russian strength; moreover, that once the Russian "fatherland" was invaded, the Russian people resolutely rose to the occasion and pushed back the invader. This legend is false to the core. Aside from the fact that 2.5 million Russian soldiers had been captured by December, 1941, the success of German arms in Russia during the first six weeks of the war amazed even the German military leaders. It was not the superiority of Russian morale or equipment that pushed back the Nazis, but precisely the inferiority of the Russian army. After a thorough study of the matter, B. H. Liddell Hart astutely observes: "What saved Russia above all was not her modern progress, but her backwardness." (*German Generals Talk*, p. 166). The first element in this backwardness was the Russian road system. "If the Soviet government had given her (Russia) a road system comparable to that of western countries, she would probably be overrun in quick time." (167.) Manteuffel gave Hart the following picture of what the German generals encountered in Russia:

"The advance of a Russian Army is something that Westerners can't imagine. Behind the tank spearheads rolls on a vast horde, largely mounted on horses. The soldier carries a sack on his back, with dry crusts of bread and raw vegetables collected on the march from the fields and villages. The horses eat the straw from the house roofs — they get very little else. The Russians are accustomed to carry on for as long as three weeks in this primitive way, when advancing. You can't stop them, like an ordinary army, by cutting their communications, for you rarely find any supply columns to strike." (p. 226).

Naturally, the Russians produced "good" tanks and cleverly simplified sub-machine guns. A country which drains its entire productive apparatus for military production can devise equipment of all kinds. But (speaking strictly, here, from the military point of view) the Russian army was not and is not a truly modern army. Its "victories" were gained on bases that no modern army can rest upon to-day. These entered decisively, although not alone, into the defeat of the Germans.

purchasing cheap watches, trinkets, shoes and even Jewish religious shawls for wearing apparel. The political authorities had systematically to comb the army for these cheap articles because the sight of them in Russia would have resulted in a demoralizing effect. The Russian army had to be "de-bourgeoisified" time and again during the two years before the German invasion.

The experiences of the Russian army in Europe in 1944 raised these problems to the tenth power. They guided the character of Russian domination in Eastern Europe. The most effective danger that presented itself to the stability of the Stalinist régime was the presence of a material level in areas under its hegemony or in close proximity to its frontiers that could in any way provide alternatives to the poverty of the Russian people. That Eastern Europe, depressed by Western imperialism, was not developed enough to comprise such a challenge goes without saying. But any contact with countries that presented some variant to the bureaucratically or surreptitiously administered access to material privileges in Russia had, and continues to have, a profoundly unsettling effect. This effect grew in geometric proportion as the Russian army moved through Eastern Europe. By the time the army entered fairly advanced areas like Czechoslovakia and Prussia, it was threatened with dissolution.

Whoever sits before a map of present-day Europe and endeavors to consider how the Russian army will "race" to the Atlantic, or thrust its forces here and there, make "double envelopments", "flank movements", etc. — and does this without recognizing that the Russian army embodies all the contradictions of Russian society — lives in a world of illusions. The greatest threat to the Stalinist régime and the military forces under its command is not an opposing military body but the material superiority of Western Europe, apart from all military factors. Unless this material level is drastically lowered, the Stalinist régime will be confronted with having to operate with famished men in uniform in a sea of industrial products and direly needed commodities. The picture is relative, but its own consequences admit of very little doubt: it would be an absolute impossibility to manipulate such a body of troops, especially if they also attempted to hold down bitterly hostile populations who still have the morale and social traditions to support an effective day-to-day resistance. It is not accidental that Russia can only hope, and this with very unsuccessful results, to operate amid depressed areas and predominantly agricultural countries.

At the outset, exploitation in Eastern Europe must go hand in hand with economic depression, with the systematic levelling of the territory under Stalinist control to corresponding, if not lower, conditions in Russia. No variation of conditions is permissible unless it duplicates the coercive system of castes in Russia and lends itself to bureaucratic manipulation by the Kremlin. Alone on these empirical and practical grounds Stalinist hegemony spells an overall lowering of all economic levels in Eastern Europe. The Russian armistice terms dictated to Rumania and Hungary only faintly reflect the looting that the Kremlin has enacted throughout half the European continent. The terms required that Rumania give reparations in goods amounting to \$300,000,000 in 1938 prices, or well over twice that amount to-day. Fifty per cent. of these goods were to be petroleum products; 32 per cent. — ships, barges, locomotives and industrial equip-

ment; 18 per cent. — agricultural goods and timber. When Vice-Premier Tatarescu was engaged in his conflict with the Communist Party, he estimated that 50 per cent. of total Rumanian production was being taken by Russia.

Official reparations figures by no means disclose the magnitude of Stalinist looting in Eastern Europe. Virtually all the essential machinery of the Ploesti oil fields, Rumania's chief industry, was ruinously dismantled and shipped to the Caucasus. More than a fifth of Rumania's textile and metallurgical machinery found its way to Russia. In addition, the Russians took well over a quarter of a million head of cattle, 100,000 wagon loads of cereals and 5,500 wagon loads of sugar. Large Russian occupation armies lived off the Rumanian budget, adding in their characteristic way to the draining of the economy. According to E. D. Tapp, Russia drained an estimated 84 per cent. of the Rumanian national income from 1945 to 1948, after which (we may add) a curtain on information almost completely concealed the country from a reasonably accurate investigation of economic data.

The same reparations in the 1938 price of goods were demanded of Hungary, a third of which was to be shared between Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia. Industrial reparations were to comprise 83 per cent. of the goods, despite the fact that this commodity sector was scarcely a third of the country's exports. "An U.N.R.R.A. estimate shows that in 1945, 94 per cent. of the working capacity of the metal and engineering industries in Hungary was being used for reparation-goods for Russia. The British parliamentary delegation which visited Hungary in the spring of 1946 estimated that reparation demands amounted to 18 per cent. of the national income.

"The Hungarian budget for the year 1946-7 set aside for reparations a sum eight times bigger than that allocated to reconstruction (and we must not forget that a large part of the Russian loot is not even included in the budget as it was taken from industries officially in Russian hands). On 23rd July, 1946, in a note to the Soviet Government, the U.S. Ambassador in Moscow pointed out that half the current industrial production of Hungary was absorbed in meeting Russia's demands. In some industries, including coal, iron and machine production the proportion was 80-90 per cent. At the Peace Conference in Paris in October, 1946, the U.S. representatives claimed that in the year since the armistice about 35 per cent. of the national income of Hungary was spent on the costs of Soviet reparations, occupation and requisitions. The British parliamentary delegation mentioned above estimated the occupation costs at 12 per cent. of the national income of Hungary, making with reparations a total of 30 per cent." An American diplomatic note in July 1946 claimed that the Russian army alone expropriated all the meat, one-sixth of the two principal grains, one-seventh of the legumes, one-tenth of the vegetable oils, one-fifth of the dairy products and nearly three-quarters of the lard available to the urban population of the country in 1945. This reduced the already bad diet of Hungarian city dwellers to 850 calories a day, a slow starvation level that took an enormous toll in human lives.

Extensive dismantling reached into countries that had never been allies.

¹ Gluckstein, *op. cit.*, pp. 60-61.

of the Germans during the last war. "Sixty big industrial enterprises in the Sudeten region and a number of enterprises in other parts of Czechoslovakia were dismantled by the Russian army. In the part of Germany annexed to Poland the Russian army dismantled, according to estimates of the Communist Minister of Industry, Hilary Mine, 25-30 per cent. of all the industrial equipment of the area. In Old Poland, too, the Russian army dismantled machinery, notably in the Lodz and Bialystok textile works."⁹ Obviously, these are only the admitted facts. There can be absolutely no doubt that Russia swept across all the areas of Eastern Europe, irrespective of their relation to the German war machine, and dismantled as her reparation commissions pleased.

Outright dismantlings have eased off considerably in the past four years, although not entirely; but exploitation continues on a massive scale and has since become more intensive. The Russians perpetuate the depression of the area in many ways, partly by so-called joint or mixed companies, partly by assuming an exceptionally parasitic *entrepôt* rôle in East European commerce. Rumanian oil, for example, is owned by a mixed Russo-Rumanian enterprise which means that Russia completely dominates the petroleum industry.¹⁰ Similar relationships exist in every important industry and in every country of Eastern Europe. Sometimes they are quite open, at other times the relationships are carefully disguised. The effect, however, is a patent domination of those industries which remain to the European countries after dismantlings are completed. The Russians subject all the satellite industries, mixed or not, to the same demands that appear at home. Russian commissions make extensive surveys of the East European economies, participate in the formulation of new "plans" and "norms", cajole managers publicly and direct accusations or recommendations against "leaders" of the satellite states. This often assumes such unabashed forms that recent trials in Eastern Europe included indictments against former state leaders for concealing production statistics from Russian advisors and for refusing to comply with the recommendations of Russian commissions. The humiliation of the Stalinist régimes in the East is as extravagant as the boasts of economic progress in the Stalinoid press.

An illustration of Russian operations with mixed enterprises was revealed by Milentije Popovic, Yugoslav Minister of Foreign Trade, after the Tito-Stalin break. During negotiations for the organization of a Russo-Yugoslav oil company, the Yugoslavs were asked to divide all profits equally with the Russian part of the concern. The Yugoslavs cordially reminded their Stalinist brethren that the value of the oil fields should enter into a consideration of the profit distribution and that Yugoslavia was therefore entitled to a larger share. The Russians categorically refused to permit such considerations to disturb their profits, and accused the Yugoslavs of demanding . . . "capitalist rent". Capitalist Belgrade got its own way by breaking with capitalist Moscow, but other countries have not been so fortunate. Mixed enterprises elsewhere are completely rent free. Indeed, they enjoy extensive "socialist" privileges like reduced tax payment and

⁹ *Ibid*, pp. 61-62.

¹⁰ According to the Titoist organ, *Borba*, 6th July, 1949, four-fifths of the oil taken from Rumanian wells is sent to Russia as reparations or as the property of *Sov Petrol*.

exemptions. They receive "socialist" priority in skilled labor, resources and transportation. Russian "socialist" commissions are given a free "socialist" hand in determining the "socialist" policies of the enterprises and the "socialist" production norms. These enterprises have thus become a cornerstone of Stalinist domination. They tend to grow parasitically out of proportion to the genuine requirements of the countries in which they are located and keel the domestic economy one-sidedly. In short, they not only facilitate the exploitation of Eastern Europe, but also increase all its economic disproportions. This yields devastating effects for the entire area.

Russian manipulations in East European commerce have become notorious since they were given publicity by the Belgrade government. Typical instances can be drawn from the Popovic report. According to Popovic, Yugoslavia was compelled to pay Russia \$2,000,000 for electrical generators which could be bought in Western Germany for \$450,000; \$41,850 for suction pumps that were obtainable at \$13,000; \$377,000 for cranes which were priced at \$250,000 elsewhere. In turn, Yugoslavia was obliged to sell Russia bauxite and copper at prices considerably below world market prices. *Borba*, for example, reports that Russia paid as little as 45,000 dinars for a ton of molybdenum that cost Yugoslavia 500,000 dinars to produce. This situation exists for every East European country in its commercial relations and infamous "trade agreements" with Russia. Thus, Hungarian export prices for goods to Russia have been shown to be half of those in Western Europe. The trade agreement of August, 1945, obliged Poland to sell Russia coal at ridiculously low prices — estimated variously to be from \$1 to \$2 a ton. World prices in 1945 were \$10 to \$12 a ton, and \$15 to \$16 in 1947. Felix Belair, in the *Herald Tribune*, claims that Russian leather manufactured into shoes at 170 crowns per pair in Czechoslovakia actually cost the Czechs 300 crowns to produce. The Czechs, in turn, were obliged to buy Russian grain in 1947-8 at 62 per cent. above world wheat prices.

Russia not only buys at absurdly low, often nominal, prices, but also markets satellite produce at an enormous margin of profit. Characteristic is the fact that the overwhelming bulk of Polish products sold to Finland in 1946 were actually bought from Russia. The proportion was 12 to 1,663. While the prices involved remain unknown, Italy's experience with the Bulgarian tobacco crop suggests what Russia pays the satellites in these exchanges. In 1948, Russia acquired four-fifths of Bulgarian tobacco at such low prices that she was in a position to sell it to Italy for 35 per cent. below Bulgarian export tobacco prices, thus fantastically undercutting a satellite with its own produce! This represents a monopoly over East European production and resources that compares only with the worst features of imperialist exploitation. It is an acid commentary, lest any illusions remain, of the extension of "socialism" to the European continent.

The most "celebrated" economic achievement of the Russians in Eastern Europe is the so-called "land reform". If the Stalinist press abroad has published stock and monotonously repetitive descriptions of industrial "advances" in the East, it has tried to picture the break-up of the estates in Russian "liberated" areas as a unique social advance. Even opponents of the Kremlin have credited this to the Russians. Close inspection, however, shows that the reform is meaningless or exaggerated on the whole, and very tentative where it counts for anything. In Poland, where rural changes

were long overdue, the Eastern areas of the country in which large estates existed were "ceded" to Russia and swallowed into the collective farm system. New areas in the West were acquired as a result of the most unjust territorial acquisitions and the mass expulsion of 8.5 million Germans. The decrees of September, 1944, and January, 1945, distributed some 8,300,000 hectares among four-and-a-half million Polish peasants, the overwhelming bulk of which belonged to German farmers. In old Poland proper, less than 3.5 million hectares were divided among the peasants. The effect of this distribution was to give an average of two hectares to each peasant, an absurdly small amount; to do this primarily at the expense of the Germans; and to turn the big estate areas of pre-war Poland over to . . . Russia!

In Bulgaria, the land reform was meaningless. The country before the war was a land of small holdings in which further division would have rendered agricultural production completely uneconomical. The land "reforms" were thus measured in decares, that is, in one-tenth of a hectare (a hectare equals 2.4711 acres), and 1,256,000 decares of land were given to 127,000 families. Corresponding "reforms" were made in Yugoslavia and slightly more in Rumania. Only Hungarian statistics reported an extensive land division. The confiscation of Church and gentry lands with more than 50 hectares, and of peasant lands with more than 100 hectares, released approximately 8 million acres of land for distribution. This was distributed among 640,000 families, or an average of 12.5 acres per family. When it is remembered that Hungary's principal crop is wheat, however, it seems that farms on this dimension are completely unworkable. The "reform", in fact, so completely disrupted Hungarian agriculture that the country, once the granary of Europe, had to import Canadian wheat in 1947.

The over-all effect of the land distribution was to create what Peter Meyer appropriately called "dwarf parcels which could not secure a decent living to their owners. The only solution of the economic problems of these countries would be a judicious industrialization — which would absorb a part of the peasantry into the city — combined with the modernization of agriculture. That was recognized, before the war, by all serious students of East Europe".¹⁰

Eastern Europe, however, has received neither industry nor even a lasting "land reform". Indeed, the very opposite has occurred. By 1948 and 1949, the satellite régimes began to move into a position to collectivize the countryside; in short, to undo the land policies formulated directly after the war. It is not surprising that the sharpest edge of the new program is being felt in Hungary, where, according to a report in the *N.Y. Times* "... agricultural collectivization proceeded . . . faster than in other countries where land reform was carried out on less radical lines". (6th February, 1949.) Indeed, the basis for collectivization was already established in the "reform" itself when land expropriations resulted in delivering all farm machinery to the state, thus setting up an instrument to coerce the peasants into compliance with later policies. The result has since been a succession of broken promises, of rural manipulations and exploitation that places a heavier yoke upon the peasant than at any time in the past.

In Bulgaria, for example, peasants were driven into collective farms with the solemn promise that profits would be shared out according to the land

¹⁰ *Commentary*, March, 1952.

that was "contributed" to the collective. Shortly afterwards, new draft statutes were imposed which paid farmers only 20 to 30 per cent. for their land and 70 per cent. for the "labor days" they worked. These norms are now widespread throughout Eastern Europe. In the face of rising resentment, the satellite régimes are quick to leave no doubts in the public mind that increasing exploitation of agricultural labor continues to be the end in view. On 25th January, 1949, Mihaly Keresztes, Hungarian Under Secretary of Agriculture, flatly declared that "if the income distribution was effected justly on the basis of labor units each member of the co-operative will work well and as much as possible". The *N.Y. Times* dispatch, which carried this report, continued: "Two days later a conference of production group and machine tractor station workers in Budapest promised that 'we shall take care that income of groups be distributed on the basis of labor units. We shall end reactionary "equal distribution" based on working days'.

"What this means is piece work in agriculture as in industry." (6th February, 1949.)

The levelling of Eastern Europe includes a general policy that makes of Poland and the Balkans raw material countries designed to supply Russia with cheap resources and half-finished industrial commodities. This policy stands in decisive contradiction to all the needs of the area. For peoples who suffer from extreme over-population, the final blow is rural collectivization, *which simply means the application of intensive factory methods to the countryside*. The whole principle of collective farming to-day involves a further reduction of agricultural labor, a diminishing of the economic base of millions of peasants, a forcing of more people outside the economy. How will these millions live? Where will they find a place in the economy to support themselves?

To ask these questions is to answer them. In May, 1949, unemployment resulted in strikes and demonstrations in certain areas of Rumania. Among the principal victims were the Ploesti oil workers, thousands of whom became jobless because of Russian dismantlings. Moreover, according to *Borba* (6th July, 1949), the Reshice steel plant struck for three days and in Kulshti the unemployed demonstrated in the streets. The régime answered this overt discontent by starting preparatory work on the Danube-Black Sea canal. Now, two years after the project was started, no doubt remains that this canal is being excavated by slave laborers.

Since October, 1948, when the Czech cabinet adopted a bill to establish labor camps, increasing evidence has appeared to show that the entire pattern of Russian slave labor is being slowly extended to Eastern Europe. On 27th June, 1950, Patchova, a deputy to the Czech parliament frankly averred that "... a prisoner sentenced as an enemy of the Peoples' Democracy, who, by his work and behaviour while serving his sentence, does not show improvement justifying the hope that he will lead the life of a decent working man, can be sent to a forced labor camp after he has served his sentence". A May 1952 digest of news from Eastern Europe (published by the *National Committee for a Free Europe*) carries the photostat of a release ticket for slave laborers on the Danube-Black Sea canal project in Rumania. Compulsory labor penalties have been applied to "criminals" on the very admission of *Radio Budapest*. Milecin is a known slave labor camp in Poland, and Bulgarian camps are reported to have been

established at Kuznian near Pernik and at Belene. Around these "institutions" is a host of laws which are designed to regiment the entire population. On 15th January, 1952, *Rude Pravo* (Prague) reported the following comment from Havelka, Czech Labor Minister: "New methods of labor recruitment have been introduced by the government ordinance of 27th December, 1951. . . . By this new ordinance the entire existing system, which was based on the voluntary movement of labor under State supervision, will be abandoned, and a new system will be applied which will directly control labor recruitment for the most important sectors of our industry in the same way as our entire Socialist economy is directed." In Hungary, *Radio Budapest* (24th January, 1952) quoted Gero, Chairman of the Peoples Economic Council as follows: "Arbitrary quitting of jobs is . . . to be qualified as a crime . . . corrective-educational labor should be applied to those guilty of it. Those who are not conscious enemies of our social order and planned economy should be educated by the courts to respect discipline, not by depriving them of freedom, but by imposing corrective educational work on them." [1] The evidence can be multiplied indefinitely. Not a month has passed in recent years but that the satellite régimes enact new strictures and penalties against all sectors of the population according to Russian standards.

The coercion of Eastern Europe has been achieved with a severity and national chauvinism that compares only with the operations of the Nazi régime in Poland and the Ukraine. Perhaps the grossest illustration is the treatment of German minorities in Czechoslovakia and Poland (and, recently, Jewish minorities — c.f. "Anti-Semitism in Eastern Europe", p. 39). After Russian armies entered these areas, the Stalinist régimes openly continued the war not only against German armed forces, but against traditional German communities which had existed for centuries in the Sudetenland and Western Poland. Under Nejedly's slogan: "We do not know any progressive Germans, nor are there any," (May, 1945) the Czechoslovakian "Peoples' Democracy" turned upon two-and-a-half million Sudetens with a ferocity that cost the lives of many thousands and led to the virtual expulsion of this minority from the country. Stalinist troops surrounded Sudeten villages, herded entire communities into barns with rubber truncheons, clubs and amid rifle shots, tortured and executed many, and finally marched the destitute population across the mountains to the German frontier. The facts collected by Arno Behrisch, an anti-Nazi refugee during the war and afterward vice-chairman of the Bavarian Social Democratic Party, have justified the opinion that, "The outrages were not individual cases but part of a system which may well boast of having attained the fullest Nazi standard".¹¹ The results of this mistreatment, so reminiscent in every detail of Nazi round-ups in Jewish communities, may well have resulted, for example, in the death of nearly three-quarters of the German people from Trappau because of the journey alone! This does not include "casual" shootings, beatings, acts of murder, rape and deliberate starvation, which took an extremely heavy toll in the villages of the Sudetenland before the actual expulsions were effected.

The same pattern was repeated throughout Eastern Germany. Transports

¹¹ A Petition to the Secretary General of the United Nations, etc. From the Parliamentary Delegation of the Sudeten Labour in Great Britain, p. 41.

went in two directions: westward, with predominantly aged people, women and children; eastward, toward Siberia, with unknown numbers of healthy German males. A wild chauvinistic feeling against Germans as such charged the atmosphere. But the Germans were not the only victims. On 27th September, 1945, Gottwald turned against the Hungarian minority in Czechoslovakia and flatly declared: "We are trying to establish the principle that we cannot live side by side with the Hungarians in one state." This statement was followed by a widespread assault on the social and economic position of the Hungarian minority in the country. The situation grew so heated that as late as August, 1946, the Hungarian foreign minister — an official of a state under Russian hegemony! — was obliged to complain: "650,000 Hungarians who live in Slovakia were deprived of their citizenship and even of their most elementary rights. Their property has been confiscated. No Hungarian may undertake any manual or intellectual work. He may not claim justice, he may not become a member of a trade union, he may not exercise his civic rights. The use of Hungarian in offices and even in churches and in public places is prohibited and subject to penalties. No newspaper or periodical in Hungarian may be published in Czechoslovakia, nor is it allowed to speak over the telephone or send wires in Hungarian. Hungarians may not own radio receivers. All Hungarian schools are closed, and even tuition in Hungarian is subject to penalties. The Czecho-Slovak authorities have dismissed all civil servants and private employees of Hungarian descent, and they have suspended payment of their pensions. Disabled servicemen, war-widows, and orphans do not receive their relief allocations." Even Rakosi, General Secretary of the Hungarian Communist Party, admitted of "excesses resembling the old fascist methods" in the Czechoslovakian "Peoples' Democracy". The situation "quieted down" in the spring of 1949, when the consolidation of Stalinist rule in Czechoslovakia rendered the issue too embarrassing . . . and after 100,000 Hungarians had been expelled.

What the Czechs did to Germans and Hungarians, the Poles did to Czechs in Polish areas and the Czechs did to Poles in Czech areas. Gluckstein, who has compiled much of the above data, quotes the *Central European Observer* and *Radio Prague* as follows: "The Central European Observer of 19th October, 1945, wrote: 'In Hlubcice and Ratibor, Czech people are suffering injustices: their harvest is taken away, their property confiscated. They are being arrested and taken into the interior of the country. Church services in the Czech language or in the local dialect have been forbidden. Czechs are fleeing across the frontier. There are already several thousands of refugees.' On 27th December, 1945, Radio Prague complained that the Poles had dissolved the National Committees in the part of Teschen inhabited by Czechs, had replaced them with Polish mayors appointed by themselves, and had closed all schools except the Polish ones. On 27th March, 1946, the Czech National Council in Morawska-Ostrawa in retaliation forbade the use of the Polish language in Teschen schools which had Polish pupils." (*East Europe*, 3rd April, 1946.)¹²

Popular Resistance to the Iron Heel

The severity of Stalinist domination in Eastern Europe has led to widespread resistance among the population. This resistance exhibited itself

¹² Gluckstein, *op. cit.*, pp. 204-5.

partly in the traditional political movements that existed for a while after Russian occupation, meagre as many of the older parties proved to be. The popular sentiment against Stalinist rule, however, proved to be so widespread that several years had to pass before the Kremlin could complete its physical and nominal control of Eastern Europe. These years were occupied with the systematic disintegration of the Peasant and Socialist parties, a wave of mass repression and finally the driving of all opposition into illegal or subterranean channels.

It is unnecessary to repeat, here, the details of the party conflicts in Russian controlled territory. Where opposition parties had roots in the population, they were physically extirpated. The popular support of parties like the Hungarian Small Holders was terrorized into apparent acquiescence, while its active leaders were silenced by death. The party, which received 59 per cent. of the vote, was reduced to a sham. The Polish Peasant party was counterfeited by a Stalinist-controlled body claiming to act in its name until Mikolajczyk returned to the country. Its best people had perished during the Warsaw uprising. In the elections of 1947, however, many thousands of Peasant party followers were rounded up and held until it was too late for them to vote. Later, the regional leaders of the party were permanently arrested and Mikolajczyk had to leave the country. The powerful Polish Socialist Party was directly suppressed by a rival, Stalinist-controlled executive. But even this paper organization proved to be too recalcitrant under mass pressure. It was fused with the official Stalinists into the self-styled "United Polish Workers Party" and many of its former leaders were executed. Similar techniques were repeated in Rumania, Bulgaria and Czechoslovakia. The pattern varied in details but not in its essential outlines of arrest, trials and executions. Between 1948 and 1950 all legal vestiges of opposition had been removed from Eastern Europe.

The fact remains, however, that popular resistance has not only continued in the entire area, but finds its own characteristic methods of obstruction and its unique counter-strokes to the Kremlin. The masses, faced with the *fait accompli* of Stalinist repression, have adapted themselves to the situation by working out their own, all-pervasive, day-to-day defense against the terror apparatus. This translates itself into economic obstruction, sabotage, widespread absenteeism in factories and the withholding of crops in the countryside. In Czechoslovakia, for example, absenteeism among foundry workers increased from 2.4-3.5 per cent. before the war to 15 per cent. in March, 1949. "The position was even more critical in the building industry: in the four principal building undertakings in the Morawska Ostrawa district alone 53,420 working-shifts had been lost, while another building enterprise at Tabor registered 50 per cent. of absentees. (Quoted by *News from Czechoslovakia*, May, 1949.) On September 21st, 1949, Premier Zapotocky told the Czechoslovak Trade Union Council that absenteeism among the workers so far that year was already more than 37 per cent. higher than in 1947. (*Lidove Noviny*, 22nd Sept., 1949.) Even the National Assembly's decision of 24th March, 1950, to deduct from the holiday days missed without good reason would probably not

altogether stop this expression of the increasing 'enthusiasms' of the workers for the régime."¹¹

The situation in the Czechoslovakian mining industry has become so difficult that it continually gives rise to rumors of unrest and obstruction. Despite unrelieved terrorization in this industry, Jan Teper at a meeting of the Central Committee of the miners "union" was compelled implicitly to admit that 25 per cent. of the miners have refused to assume piecework obligations (*Lidové Noviny*, 29th June, 1951). Of the 75 per cent. who have assumed such obligations, "only 64 per cent. were performing any piecework as of June 28th, 1951". On 10th June of the same year, *Rude Pravo* reported that the plan for the first five months of 1951 revealed a downward trend. In almost every industry — coal, ore and oil, electric power, foundries, heavy machinery, transport, precision instruments, building materials, glass, pottery and leather goods — except textiles, lumber and chemicals, production had fallen from 1 to 6 per cent., the norm being about 4 per cent. of unfulfilment. "It has not been possible to guarantee important deliveries to the Soviet Union and to the countries of the peoples' democracies," complained Josef Frank, deputy Central Secretary of the Czechoslovak Communist Party on 3rd June (*Nova Svoboda*). "Our own returns are far below the Plan. The task set by Gottwald — economy in production — has not been systematically reduced; machinery and equipment are not being utilized to the fullest extent; unproductive factors have not been reduced; output did not keep pace with wages; no savings have been effected in raw materials . . . labor recruitment has lagged. . . . Only through Gottwald's influence did we acquire in 1950 10,000 sincere apprentices by virtue of the Lany Action." And what happened to these "sincere apprentices"? Frank continues: "From September to December 1, 1950, 1,606 of these boys left the miners' training schools . . . another 1,550 left during the first three months of this year. . . . There is unbelievable disorder, lack of sanitation and bad influences in their dormitories . . . the boys become victims of demoralization, drinking, etc. . . . The mining industry is losing more recruits during the year than the number of workers being added. . . . Nor is any improvement being shown in transportation . . ." The bureaucratic mismanagement of the régime, coupled with the hatred of the workers in the country, has reduced the splendid industrial economy of Czechoslovakia to a characteristic Russian caricature of "socialist efficiency".

In Czechoslovakia, collectivization has been pressed very slowly. The régime, confronted with mounting crises in industry, has not tried with any vigour to toy with the highly rationalized agricultural economy. It has enough on its hands elsewhere. Here too, however, Frank's report is dismal: "Beef cattle declined within the first three months of 1951 by 90,991, hogs by 246,138, sows by approximately 14,000 . . . with the result that for those three months only 95.9 per cent. of the Plan figures for slaughterhouse purchases of calves and 81.5 per cent. of the hogs were available. Only 93.3 per cent. of the scheduled milk supply was delivered. . . . The area of soil under cultivation is falling off . . ." and so on and on. Recently, the agricultural situation in the country came to a head. On 9th February, 1952, *Radio Prague* broadcast an explosive picture of the

¹¹ *Ibid*, p. 106.

crisis in the countryside. "Deficiencies in the supplies of meat and meat products have occurred during last year, in particular during the second half of 1951. As a result of these deficiencies, the growing demands of the workers could not be met; on the contrary, it was found necessary to limit the free market and to substitute allocations of rice and sugar for 300 grams of meat per month on the controlled market. . . . These deficiencies in agricultural production and in bulk buying bear witness to unsatisfactory political work in the country and among small and medium farmers."

The opposition of the Czechoslovak workers is duplicated throughout all the industrial areas of the East. Absenteeism is reported on a wide scale in Poland, Rumania and Bulgaria. In Hungary, the situation has been so difficult that Istvan Kossa, Hungarian Minister of Industry, declared quite flatly: "The workers have assumed a terrorist attitude to the directors of the nationalized industries" (6th December, 1948). The principal source of opposition in the Balkans, however, comes from the countryside if only because the countries of these areas remain primarily agricultural and economic weight lies in the rural population. The situation in Bulgaria exemplifies the difficulties Stalinism has encountered in promoting its collective farm plans. In this country, Gluckstein tells us, "peasant resistance took the characteristic form of non-delivery of their quota of products. Despite the good harvest in 1948, by October 10th only one district had delivered its quota, thirteen districts had delivered between 80 and 90 per cent., but many more had not even fulfilled half the quota. (*Rabotnichesko Delo*, organ of the Community Party, October 15th and 17th, 1948). 1948 was bad enough, but 1949 was much worse. The sowing quotas were nowhere near completion on the final date, March 15th. Only 56 per cent. of the wheat quota was completed, 45 per cent. of the rye, 55 per cent. of the barley, 51 per cent. of the oat, and 14 per cent. of the sunflower quotas. (*Otechestven Front*, 25th March, 1949.) The Ministry of Agriculture reported that many villages met great obstacles in collecting grain. In the village of Dimitriev, for instance, the Village Council showed no effort to fulfil its duty and barely 1,200 kilos of grain were turned in. The co-operative of villages had very inadequate granaries, etc., etc. (*Otechestven Front*, 31st July, 1949)."

Space prohibits a recounting of the details that enter into Gluckstein's report of the problem. Suffice it to say that by 1950 the situation in the Bulgarian countryside became so chaotic that the régime began to "soften" its collectivization drive. Chervenkov, secretary of the Bulgarian Communist Party, was obliged to increase the price of grain paid to the peasantry and to leave larger amounts of food in the possession of the rural producers. In 1950, after several years of collectivization drives, only 43.4 per cent. of the agricultural population had been pressured into collective farms.

Collectivization in Poland makes for a report that is equally dismal. Peasant resistance has proved to be so effective that the régime has continually scaled down its targets — in 1949 dropping its goals from 7,400 farms to as little as 200! Obstruction has continued to such a point that recently, on 15th February, 1952, the Polish Sejm voted heavy penal sanctions against recalcitrants in the countryside. According to *Trybuna Ludu* (16th February): ". . . in cases of non-delivery of livestock the

"Ibid, p. 119.

original quota could be raised by 10 per cent. and compulsory collection instigated. . . . Agricultural holdings which do not fulfil their duties are subject to 3,000 zloty fine and, in extreme cases involving wilful avoidance of the fulfilment obligation or agitation against the plan, up to three years of imprisonment is provided". Dab-Kociol, Polish Minister of Agriculture, advised activists in the same paper that, "Mass political action will convince [!] the broad peasant masses that the system of obligatory deliveries will put an end to the situation whereby only two-thirds of the agricultural holdings sold pigs to the State and nearly one-third, or about one million agricultural holdings, did not participate in pig deliveries. This made distribution to towns difficult and gave kulaks and speculators a chance to profit".

The same monotonous flow of reports, reprisals, coercion and resistance comes without exception from every country in Eastern Europe. For every admission there are obviously hundreds of unreported difficulties that never enter into the press accounts. Every sector of industry and agriculture is involved. In some instances, especially in Bulgaria, local Stalinists are obliged to oppose the régime because of the impossibility of the demands and fear of the population. In other cases, the régimes have admitted to physical action taken by the population against Stalinist "activists". A chronic civil war pervades the countryside of Eastern Europe and lurks in the factories of the cities. The governments are so unstable that only the absence of an alternative prevents this day-to-day conflict from exploding into a continental conflagration."

American Policy and Eastern Europe

All the internal conditions for revolution against the satellite régimes exist in Eastern Europe to-day. Dissatisfaction is widespread; hatred of the coercive techniques in industry and the collectivization policies in agriculture completely penetrate every pore of society. Even if the Kremlin "caretakers" are not immediately pushed out by the masses of the East, even if the terror machine has had some measure of success in dispersing the forces for an organized overthrow of the Stalinists, the whole area is proving to be completely indigestible to Russia. The Kremlin has subjugated Eastern Europe, but it has absolutely failed to stabilize the area. The dominated population has answered its task masters with a daily, indeed a minute to minute defense — that uncontrollable, defensive corrosion by every individual of the foundations of Russian power. Each atom of humanity, simply by protecting himself, eats away the fabric of Stalinist domination. Each operates with the perspective that the state is his enemy and that his most elementary needs can only be satisfied by opposing, deceiving and resisting the oppressor who rides on his shoulders. The *Gleichschaltung* itself is being dispersed for lack of any solid elements on which it can be fixed. Its failure compares with a plow that easily cuts through the sand, but cannot leave any furrows.

The one factor which makes it difficult for the peoples of Eastern Europe

¹⁰ Even with the systematization of the terror in Eastern Europe, reports continue to indicate the existence of overt guerilla activity in Poland and the Balkans. A dispatch by C. L. Sulzberger, as late as 25th July, 1951 (*N.Y. Times*) informs us that Rumanian partisans are reported to be operating in the mountains near Pitesti, in the mountains of western Transylvania, in the Maramuresh mountains, in Moldavia and other areas of the country.

to complete the corrosion of Stalinist power is the absence of a material perspective, of a fundamental alternative to those economic problems which existed before Russia's entry. The opposition to the satellite régimes has a defensive rather than an offensive complexion not only because of the terror machine, but principally because everyone must ask: what will follow if these régimes are unseated? The whole contemporary history of Eastern Europe indicates that a restoration of pre-war conditions would continue to pose the issue of industrialization, of a primitive agricultural base and millions of "surplus" human beings. The West, which potentially can supply an alternative, is only remembered as the factor which obstructed the economic development of Eastern Europe in the past. Indeed, to Western capitalism, the East has remained a "problem area", a continental source of economic and social crises which, in the heightened crisis of world capitalism, has to be "stabilized".

It is only if one remembers that capitalism in Western Europe could never develop Eastern Europe, and that for the West the entire area has been notoriously designated as a "trouble spot" which has to be settled "once and for all" — it is only if this is clearly borne in mind, that the whole course of events during and after the second World War becomes intelligible. *For the essential thread of these events clearly points to the fact that America coolly delivered Eastern Europe to Russia and has since done everything to perpetuate Stalinist domination in the area, despite all the rhetoric of the "cold war".* The logic behind this betrayal of all the avowed "democratic" war aims of the Allies is immediately brought into relief when one asks: what could America do about Eastern Europe if Russia were not present to occupy the area? It is apparent that the East would have emerged from the war under conditions that would have fostered revolutionary crises throughout the entire European continent. It is equally apparent that the American government, which is not a totalitarian power as yet and must answer to public opinion for all the repressive measures it takes, can not apply the terror that Stalinist Russia has perfected. Russia thus plays the rôle of a needed policeman in the East; Stalinist repression is an indispensable precondition for American policy in the world to-day. The irritants and antagonisms that separate the two countries are over-ridden, in the practical day-to-day necessity for "stabilizing" restive areas, by their mutual dependence. As one leading American statesman has said (Dr. Phillip Jessup), the defeat of Russia "would leave *occupation* and reconstruction problems of such complexity as to make our present post-war problems look like child's play". (My emphasis.) Concerning this astonishing statement, Ernst Zander observes: "In ordinary language this confirms the view on which we have insisted for years — that Russia cannot simply be 'knocked out', because that would create the problem of who is going to *police the world*, which Jessup calls euphemistically the problem of 'occupation'. America is not yet 'prepared' for that and is even less prepared to tell us why there must be under all circumstances 'occupation' after the people have been 'liberated' from the tyranny they hate."¹⁰

In short, Russia supplies the coercive machinery for subjugating areas which America as yet cannot directly repress. America, by steadfastly

¹⁰ *Contemporary Issues*, No. 7, p. 176.

answering the needs of the world with re-militarization instead of economic and industrial development, by diverting wealth to armaments instead of to machinery and useful goods, robs areas like Eastern Europe of a material alternative to Stalinism.

The delivery of Eastern Europe to Stalin has been described in detail by several writers since the war, especially by military historians who wax with innocent incredulity at the "mistakes" which American generals and diplomats made during the last war. Indeed, unless it is assumed that the Allied armies were commanded by sheer idiots, that Roosevelt and Churchill were naïve infants playing at diplomacy in a crib, absolutely no doubt can remain that the U.S. systematically delivered half of the European continent to Stalin. It is only because the bulk of these operations are still unknown that any measure of doubt can still remain.¹⁷

Although post-war years ring with solemn pronouncements against Russian totalitarianism, the entire ideological fabric lies rotting on the ground. In practice, the United States has employed every expediency to come to terms with the systems it so verbosely decries. A case in point is the *rapprochement* with, and the attempt to disguise, Tito's Yugoslavia. The Belgrade régime represents a brazen fascist dictatorship, with nothing to recommend it to democrats of any shade or variety. It has imposed on Yugoslavia, detail for detail, the entire police apparatus that supervises the Russian people. Like Stalin, Tito employs slave labor on a widespread scale; like Stalin, Tito has drastically reduced living standards in Yugoslavia, imposed vicious labor codes on the working population, motivated production by a Belgrade version of "socialist" piecework, destroyed every vestige of social and civil liberties, murdered countless democratic opponents, pushes collectivization and engages in forced deliveries from the countryside, manipulates the national antagonisms of the country to maintain his domination, and exploits the populace in typical Byzantine fashion to support his hierarchy and apparatus in opulence. At a time when Handler in the *N.Y. Times* celebrates Tito's fictitious "decentralization of administration", "workers' management", "free ideological development", it may be well to cite Gluckstein's pointed criticism of the Belgrade dictatorship:

"The Yugoslav leaders do not try to explain how decentralization of the administration can be compatible with the existence of a monolithic, highly centralized, one-party system, managed by the Political Bureau; nor how workers' management of an enterprise can be compatible with a central economic plan determined by the same nine people in the centre of political power. What autonomy can a workers' council have that is elected from a list of candidates put forward by the trade union, which is centralized and controlled by the Party? Again, what autonomy can it have when the economy is planned and the vital decisions on production, such as real wages (the amount of consumers' goods to be produced and distributed nationally) are made by a central government independent of the people? How can there be genuine local self-government in a situation where everything, from factories to papers, from people to machines is in the hands of the centralized, bureaucratic state?"¹⁸

¹⁷ See Appendix: "America's Betrayal of Eastern Europe During World War II."

¹⁸ Gluckstein, *op. cit.*, p. 276.

Yet this has not prevented leading American "statesmen" and "journalists" from applauding the Titoist régime in terms that remain in absurd contradiction to Yugoslav reality. So "distinguished" a "liberal" as Justice Douglas advises the American public that "a wedge of freedom" has opened the Titoist state and that "... Yugoslavia has two presses — the People's Front papers and the Communist papers, and in recent months the two have gone at each other hammer and tongs on certain issues". Without hesitation, without a qualm of conscience, Douglas cries: "What we do find in Yugoslavia points the way. What we do on a small scale there we can do on a grand scale not only in other countries of eastern Europe but in Asia, where the stakes of the struggle between Soviet Communism and civilization are the greatest." The writer has answered Douglas by asking: "... what will be gained for the peoples of the world when instead of Stalin they have Tito, instead of Stalinist slave labor, Stalinist secret police and the entire spectrum of totalitarian fireworks, these and more are prefixed by the emblazoned name: 'TITO'? How has anything been improved by one whit?"¹⁹

Equally as crass is American policy toward the Russian prison of nations. American diplomacy to-day not only supports the entire treaty structure that gives sanction to Stalin's domination of Eastern Europe, but also does not countenance the dismemberment of Russia into separate national entities, despite countless entreaties by exile groups in the United States. This was brought to the surface after Jack McFall, Assistant Secretary of State, explicitly advised an American Senator that the United States has no intention of dismembering Russia. The statement was made when Piotr Pospelov, director of the so-called "Marx-Engels-Lenin Institute" accused the United States of following the policy which President Wilson decided upon more than thirty years ago of using the national groups in Russia against the Bolsheviks. The exile Ukrainian press frankly observes that McFall's statement dashes to the ground whatever hopes the peoples within Russia have of American support for their independence. I. Zelenko, in *L'Ukrainien*, does not mince words; he writes: "The policy of a great nation like the United States in accepting the view of the indestructibility of the Russian Empire, dooms tens of millions of people to the continuation of their historical slavery, degradation and exploitation, and such a policy is not just, it is not humane, and it is least of all democratic. To speak about the protection of the indivisibility of the Russian Empire and at the same time and in almost the same breath, to speak about the workings of democracy is not so much to be politically blind (to put it mildly) as to assume that the hearer is a political imbecile."

Although American radios broadcast a very doubtful type of propaganda into Eastern Europe — much of which is silent on real problems like collectivization and national independence — nothing has been done to give assistance, whether material or even vocal, to the vestiges of the liberation movements in the East. The U.P.A., the Ukrainian underground army which comprised a real threat to Stalin's rule in the Ukraine several years ago, was coldly ignored. While Stalin butchered unknown numbers of Ukrainian patriots, Washington kept a discreet silence before world public opinion! The same policy is being carried on toward guerrilla formations

¹⁹ *Sloga*, an anti-Titoist weekly published in Australia.

in Rumania to-day. Indeed, a policy directly opposed to any measure of assistance has characterized Washington's behaviour toward Eastern Europeans who escape from the prison régime of the Kremlin. Michael Hoffman reports in the *N.Y. Times* (19th September, 1951) that a refugee from Czechoslovakia who escapes across the U.S. occupied frontier of Germany "... stands a better than two-to-one chance of being jailed promptly like a common criminal. . . . In one district a United States judge was sentencing every illegal border-crosser to from fifteen-thirty day jail terms. He was following the letter of the United States law for the zone, which made border-crossing illegal. In another locality, the United States resident officer examined every new arrival, and sent him to the nearest court. Many border-crossers are kept in common jails for several days before trial."

The behaviour of Washington toward Russian fascism over the past decade is neither inconsistent nor a product of stupidity. It arises neither from Stalinists in the State Department (a perfectly meaningless myth that has arisen to excuse rather than explain a basic understanding between Russia and America) nor from the "naïveté" of American diplomats. On the contrary, it is quite consistent. It locates America as a business partner of Stalinist Russia and fixes Russia as the indispensable policeman for a world policy of American imperialism. Without Russia, there could be no "stabilization" of Eastern Europe. Without America holding down any economic development in Western Europe, withholding aid from the exile and liberation movements, discouraging refugees and manipulating the military and diplomatic situation so that no practical alternative is opened to the nationalities under Stalin's rule — *the Kremlin could never maintain its control over half of the European continent.*

Post Scriptum to the Exile Movements

To the extent that the exile movements have even the faintest hope that the American Government will come to the rescue of the nations imprisoned by Stalin, to that extent will they be reduced to complete social and political impotence. Many of these movements are prepared to recognize that American policy is (to put it mildly!) "unsatisfactory". It is their hope, however, that a clash of interests and a war will eventually lead to a liberation of their peoples. Such a calculation must be recognized for what it is: a chimera. For America to go to war with Russia would be a catastrophe — precisely to American bourgeois interests! Until America completes her own totalitarian development, such a war is basically excluded by the need Washington has of the Kremlin. Only a reckless twist in events, involving an accidental over-stepping of the normally controlled bounds of the "cold war", could conceivably lead to a direct conflict. Even if such a conflict were to take place in the unforeseeable future, the conduct of the war would necessarily remain in the hands of imperialists who could have no other alternative but to push Europe further into the abyss, turning the entire continent into a devastated Korea. The liberation of Eastern Europe, Yugoslavia, the Ukraine, Armenia and all the remaining nationalities terrorized by Stalin must be seen in perspective: capitalism could not develop these countries in the past and it must "stabilize" them at present. Their "liberation" would be like reopening all the wounds of the system,

infinitely putrified by Stalinist rule and new economic difficulties. The devastation and destruction resulting from war, especially a war guided by Washington, would result in an even more heightened *Gleichshaltung*, just as the last war simply replaced Hitler by Stalin and left Europe weaker than before the hostilities.

Nothing reveals the *deliberate* bankruptcy of American policy more than the simple measures that can so easily be enacted to remove Stalin from Eastern Europe, and even from the back of the Russian people. These consist solely in advancing a material perspective to Eastern Europe — first, by assisting directly in the economic development of Western Europe. The prospect of a real and democratic alternative to want and poverty would open up undreamed sluice-gates of opposition, even within the Stalinist apparatus itself. The very minions of the Kremlin would corrode it from within, and all the latent forces that have been paralyzed by Washington would revive. On the other hand, to perpetuate the least illusion of a war between America and Russia, to hold out any hope that liberation will follow such a war (assuming it can take place!) is to complement Stalinist rule however well-intentioned one's motives may be.

APPENDIX TO "EASTERN EUROPE UNDER THE IRON HEEL"

America's Betrayal of Eastern Europe During the Second World War

A fact that wants emphasis in all discussions around the so-called "cold war", is that every possibility existed for concluding the second World War in 1944, before Stalin could have completed the occupation of Eastern Europe. As early as the spring of 1944, while Allied armies were advancing along the Italian front, the plan began to take form in the Allied Mediterranean Command under General Wilson whereby troops would invade the Istrian peninsula in North Eastern Italy and move through the gap in Ljubljana to the plains of Hungary. This would have opened all of Eastern Germany and Berlin to invasion. In his report of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, General Wilson wrote: "It was possible that such a course might achieve decisive results by striking at the heart of Germany and thereby provide the most powerful kind of indirect support to General Eisenhower's operation in France by inducing the Germans to withdraw formations from the west to meet the new threat." This plan was vetoed by the Allied Command. "... General Marshall [continues Wilson] informed me that General Eisenhower required operations to clear additional French ports in order that Allied formations might be deployed in France more rapidly and on a broader front, that there were between forty and fifty divisions in the United States which could not be introduced into France as rapidly as desired or maintained there through the ports of North-West France." Wilson, in so many words, was ordered to divert a number of divisions under the Mediterranean Command for an attack on Southern France, directed toward the capture of Toulon and Marseilles. The landings were made and these cities were taken about one month after the Normandy invasion. Wilson, however, did not let the matter rest. "I admitted that General Marshall's emphasis on the necessity of seizing a major port in Southern France was to me a new factor of paramount

importance, but a shift in our operations for that purpose seemed to me to imply a strategy aimed at defeating Germany during the first half of 1945 at the cost of an opportunity to defeat him before the end of 1944."

Even after this extraordinary veto of Wilson's strategy was made, Allied operations in Southern France suggested a new possibility. This possibility is pointed out by Maj.-Gen. Fuller, in his book *The Second World War*:

"Granted that the means did not exist for a campaign in Hungary, which it is hard to grant, seeing that those employed in the invasion of Southern France would have been more than ample, then, strategically, the next best course of action would have been for the American Seventh Army, once it had landed and had occupied Toulon and Marseilles, to have turned eastwards instead of northwards, and, following in the footsteps of Hannibal and Napoleon, to have crossed the Maritime Alps, and by descending into the plains of Piedmont and Lombardy have turned the Apennines from the north while Alexander pushed his way through them from the south. This could not have failed to have cleared the Germans out of Northern Italy before winter set in, and have placed so formidable an Allied force in Venezia that the Ljubljana-Vienna campaign could have followed during the late autumn and winter months.

"Instead, what do we see? A campaign with inadequate means; with no strategic goal and with no political bottom. The war in Italy becomes senseless; for after the occupation of Rome there began that process which Winston Churchill once described as "dragging the hot rake of war of the Italian peninsula" up to the early spring of 1945'."

The reader must capture the full meaning of this astonishing shift of Allied strategy! The war in Italy was jettisoned, and valuable military forces which could have carried the attack into a vast envelopment of the Eastern and Western frontiers of Germany were scattered into southern France at a time when Allied armies were anticipating the isolation of the few German divisions in the South by taking the North of France. This not only resulted in the costly plodding of Allied armies up the Italian peninsula from the summer of 1944 to the spring of 1945 — with a terrible waste of human life, with a continuation of "strategic bombings" of German cities, with all the horrors of genocide that were perpetrated during the year — but it also prolonged the war and left Eastern Europe open to Stalinist occupation.

The story, however, by no means ends with the veto of Wilson's plan. It continues in every "tactic" that went to make up the movement of Allied armies from the Normandy beach-head to the end of the war in Europe. For subsequent facts, we turn to a very interesting study of Allied strategy in an article by Chester Wilmot, entitled: *Allies Handed Stalin His Victory*.*

Wilmot, who does not base his material on the Wilson plan, but confines himself primarily to Allied military policy on the Western front, observes quite frankly:

"The Anglo-American victory in Normandy placed Hitler's defeat beyond question. The evidence suggests that if this victory had been fully exploited the outcome of the war would have been very much more favorable to the democratic cause. In the summer of 1944 the Western allies had it in their

* *Life* magazine, 10th March, 1952.

power, if not to end the war against Germany that year, at least to ensure that the great capitals of Central Europe — Berlin, Prague and Vienna — would be liberated from Nazi rule by the West, not the East."

The issue is posed quite simply: "On the day after the fall of Paris the SHAEF Intelligence Summary, reviewing the situation in the West, declared, 'Two-and-a-half months of bitter fighting . . . have brought the end of the war in Europe within sight, almost within reach'."

"General Dwight D. Eisenhower, Supreme Commander of the Allied Expeditionary Forces, says that it was his intention, after crossing the Seine, to push forward on a broad front with priority on the left. Was this the time for the Allies to advance to the Rhine with four armies? Or was it the moment for a bold, concerted stroke at the heart of Germany's power to maintain the struggle — the Ruhr-Aachen area which was producing 51.7 per cent. of her hard coal and 50.4 per cent. of her crude steel?"

In short, the military problem was whether all the Allied armies should plod forward in a long, strung-out line (a "broad front") loosely comparable to the type of over-all advances made during the first World War, or whether they should slow down one wing and concentrate military power for a powerful thrust directly into Germany with the other. The "broad front" strategy was no strategy at all. It simply meant pushing millions of men forward by hook-and-crook, like a steam roller, folding up the German armies directly in front of them. The second involved driving a huge wedge into the German armies from the Allied flank, and rapidly seizing the central points of German resistance. Montgomery, representing British policy, favored a thrust, while Eisenhower, speaking for American policy demanded and succeeded in obtaining the "broad front strategy". This meant a categorical prolongation of the war — and in the context of events, *a deliberate slowing up of all Allied operations while the Russian army was pushing into Europe.*

It is almost torturous to recite the conflicts between the British and American generals as each step on the Western front opened new possibilities for a strategic thrust. Eisenhower coolly disrupted every attempt that was made to push rapidly into the central nuclei of German military resistance. Even when a British plan was officially adopted for a thrust in the North, Eisenhower gave ambiguous instructions which made it possible for Patton to operate at a tangent in the South. The result was the Arnhem fiasco. Patton, a completely cynical and ostentatious figure whom American war propaganda tried to blow up into an Allied "Rommel", seems to have been assigned the task of calculated "irresponsibility" — at every point frustrating British demands for a thrust into the main centers of Germany. By refusing to take the defensive, this commander, with the scarcely disguised support of Eisenhower, distributed the offensive operations of the Allied armies along the entire front, thus making it impossible for the British to collect adequate forces for their flanking movements.

Eisenhower's military operations became completely sinister toward the end of March, 1945. "On April 1 the envelopment of the Ruhr was completed. The Western Front was now wide open. Between Eisenhower and Berlin there were no prepared defenses, nor any resistance that could not be brusquely swept aside by the divisions available for his next offensive. . . . A new military consideration now entered his calculations. 'After

the Ruhr was taken,' says Eisenhower's chief of staff, 'we were convinced there would be no surrender at all so long as Hitler lived. Our feeling then was that we should be forced to destroy the remnants of the German army piece by piece with the final possibility of a prolonged campaign [1] in the rugged Alpine region of western Austria and southern Bavaria known as the National Redoubt!'

"Eisenhower decided, therefore, that after the neutralization of the Ruhr he would make a powerful thrust due *east* [! — at this point, Eisenhower suddenly developed an enthusiasm for flank movements! — R.K.] through the center of Germany with the objective of splitting the Reich in two and linking up with the Red army in the Leipzig-Dresden area. This accomplished, he intended to drive his right wing *south-east* to meet the Russians in the Danube Valley, *west of Vienna*, and seize the Redoubt before the Nazis could organize it for defense." (All emphasis is mine — R.K.)

This plan was communicated to the Russians without even securing the approval of the Combined Chiefs of Staff. It immediately brought a sharp protest from Churchill, who "considered . . . that Eisenhower's cable went far beyond tactical co-ordination into the determination of objectives which would govern the shape of post-war Europe". Eisenhower refused to budge, and he was "staunchly supported by superiors and subordinates alike. On April 7, in a cable to Marshall, Eisenhower expressed the view that no drive for the German capital should be made until he had joined forces with the Russians in the center, had reached the Baltic on the left and overrun the National Redoubt on the right. Nevertheless, Eisenhower went on to say, 'I am the first to admit that war is waged in pursuance of political aims, and, if the combined chiefs of staff should decide that the Allied effort to take Berlin outweighs purely military considerations [!] in this theatre, I would cheerfully readjust my plans and my thinking so as to carry out such an operation'."

For a man who is "the first to admit that war is waged in pursuance of political aims", Eisenhower must indeed be credited for waging a purely political war — a war in which every military opportunity was cast aside for political considerations alone! "On April 21 Eisenhower advised the Soviet high command that, apart from advancing to the Baltic near Lubeck, he was halting his armies on the general line of the Elbe, its tributary, the Mulde, and the mountainous western frontier of Czechoslovakia. He was halting, he said, for 'logistic reasons', but it was not on this account nor through fear of clashing with the Red army that he was giving up the opportunity for liberating Prague. Although Patton had already reached the Czech frontier, Eisenhower's plan provided that Third Army should now strike south-east [!] parallel with the border, advancing astride the Danube with Seventh U.S. Army on its flank and the National Redoubt as their common objective. Next day Patton's Third Army and the American Seventh Army of Lieut.-General Alexander Patch set forth on what proved to be a wild goose chase. The National Redoubt was a phantom."

To conclude the story: Shortly before the occupation of Berlin, American armies reached the Elbe river. Suddenly they were halted. And while Koniev pushed toward the German capital and finally encircled the city — American forces were withdrawn from the Elbe to a position established

by John G. Winant, the American ambassador to London, 100 miles behind the river. Patton, who could never be restrained from the offensive when the British required military reserves, actually reached Pilsen in Czechoslovakia. At once Patton became tractable and yielded to the order for a completely absurd diversion toward the Allied-invented fiction of a "National Redoubt" in the Alps. It is amazing that any sane person could accept the fiction that Nazi armies could be concentrated in the Alps, removed from all significant industry and supplies, and continue a serious war against the Allied juggernaut after the rest of Europe had been completely cleared of German armies! It is even more incredible that Allied intelligence and air reconnaissance was incapable of establishing what forces existed in this area! Yet the fiction of a "Redoubt" was reported by the American press with a pontifical seriousness that compares with pompous Hollywood versions of why the second World War was fought and how it was won.

Hacks like Ralph Ingersoll tell us: "In seeking to win the war, the United States of America had no . . . regard for political considerations." The war, we are told by this intellectual luminary, "was like football . . . It was a game played for cheers from the grandstand . . . a game in which people get hurt and a grim game which is taken seriously — but still a game." And who, if you please, could have turned the Second World War into a "game"? Roosevelt? Stettinius? Hopkins? Eisenhower? It will hardly do to consider these extremely sophisticated politicians as children. As for the American people, it may be generously conceded that they had little to do in making the decisions on the so-called "National Redoubt" or the withdrawal from the Elbe. Turn and twist as the hacks will, the cold facts can leave absolutely no doubt that American policy, military and diplomatic, was governed by very hard realities. Gen. Fuller, who toys with Ingersoll's "explanation" on Mondays is compelled to admit on Tuesdays that ". . . by the time they [the Allied conferences held in Moscow, Cairo and Teheran] were concluded, except for the extirpation of Hitlerism, everything the Western Allies had thus far fought for was jettisoned. The Atlantic Charter was thrown overboard, Poland and the Baltic States were abandoned, and the gates of eastern France opened to the Russians. Symbolic of the last concession, appropriately on 29th November at Teheran, Mr. Churchill, to the strains of the *Internationale*, presented Marshal Stalin with a Crusader's Sword." (— my emphasis — R.K.)

The war-time negotiations among the Allied powers allows of even less uncertainty, if any can remain. Mention has been made, in the opening paragraphs of this article, of the arrangements that prepared Russia's entry into Eastern Europe. These were followed at Yalta by the direct betrayal of Poland to the Russians. Roosevelt frankly informed Stalin: "You cannot, and we must not, tolerate any temporary government which will give your armed forces any trouble of this sort [in the rear]. I want you to know I am fully mindful of this . . . I hope I do not have to assure you that the United States will never lend its support in any way to any provisional government in Poland that would be inimical to your interests."* The naïve and cynical will find a host of qualifications to show that Roosevelt placed military before political considerations (if such a thing is possible!),

* *Roosevelt and the Russians*, by Edward Stettinius, 1949, p. 158.

that he did not know how the Kremlin would behave in Eastern Europe and so forth. But whoever is mindful that Yalta occurred after the Warsaw uprising, that decades of reports on the repressive activities of the Kremlin fill the files of the State Department, that the outcome of the war was conclusively decided well in advance of the Yalta Conference, will have absolutely no doubt that Roosevelt's scrupulously worded document could be construed as nothing short of the delivery of Poland to the Kremlin.

28th June, 1952.

M. S. Shiloh

ANTI-SEMITISM IN EASTERN EUROPE

SCARCELY five years have elapsed since a major Nazi war leader tauntingly predicted that Stalin would carry on the anti-Semitic policies which Hitler began. These remarks were regarded with cool incredulity by those to whom they were known. But to-day the prediction of a forgotten Nazi hangs over events in Eastern Europe with sinister reality. Nearly every report from the East breathes the foul stench of renewed 'actions' against the Jews. Centuries-old Jewish communities are simply disappearing into the wilderness of Siberia. Individuals who survived the worst holocausts of the S.S. and Gestapo are now perishing at the hands of Stalin's police. The only possible outcome of these actions is an annihilation even more certain than the concentration camps of Hitler.

Nearly every anti-Semitic technique from the equipment of Nazism is being duplicated by Stalin. 'Actions' are usually preceded by 'ideological' attacks against 'homeless cosmopolitans', 'remnants of capitalism', 'Zionists', 'spies and traitors'. The next step is to render the Jews destitute, concentrate them in central locations where they are easily accessible, administer them through demoralizing Jewish community councils and eventually herd thousands into transports to outlying concentration camps. Once the Jews are removed from general contact with the native population, they completely disappear from sight — never to be heard of again. All the pathetic scenes of Hitler's 'final solution' are finding repetition in the railroad hubs of the East. Children separated from parents, the aged and maimed — many by experiences in S.S. camps — are brutally driven into cattle cars for shipment to Russia. Again: thousands upon thousands of Jews from the satellite states of Europe are re-experiencing the crowded journey to death, travelling for days upon end without food, water or the most elementary sanitary facilities; the dead and dying lie next to the living until they can find graves beside railroad tracks or in the mass burial pits of the secret police.

* * *

The public was first introduced to Stalinist anti-Semitism during the winter of 1949, when *Pravda* exploded into a vigorous attack against 'cosmopolitans' and 'traitors' — most of whom had Jewish names. It is

little known, however, that discriminatory treatment of Jews in contemporary Russia long antedates this campaign. The truth is that the curve of anti-Semitic feeling closely follows the repressive policies of Stalin. During the mid-twenties, for example, anti-Semitism, which lay dormant since the Revolution, gained a renewed impetus when the Stalinist bureaucracy began its struggle against Trotsky. Trotsky directly accused Stalin of employing anti-Semitic innuendoes against oppositionists in the Communist Party, many of whom were Jews. Solomon Schwarz has recently published a discussion of the extent to which sentiments against the Jews not only appeared among backward sections of the Russian masses, but even among Party and governmental authorities.¹ Schwarz cites dispatches from the *Jewish Telegraphic Agency* in the autumn of 1925 which conclusively point to an 'unexpected' renewal of anti-Semitism in Russia. The correspondence of this evidence with new attacks on the Trotskyist opposition renders Stalin's participation in Russian anti-Semitism indubitable.

Whether anti-Semitism increased in the early 'thirties is difficult to prove because it was at this time that all sources of information and channels of criticism came under rigorous control. But with the purges and infamous Moscow Trials, 'discriminatory attitudes to the employment of Jews became more marked and were no longer confined to individual occupations or administrative departments. In the large cities, where most of the Jewish intellectuals and non-manual workers lived, discrimination began to influence promotions and appointments, especially in the executive, professional, and semi-professional spheres. The tales of Jewish domination of the professions and government jobs spread anew and, going uncontradicted by the press and the Communist leadership, led to further stealthy, and sometimes open, discriminatory treatment of Jewish employees and job-seekers.' It is possible to support this allegation with statistics from Russian sources showing a decline in the number of Jews holding administrative and governmental positions. This policy was carried to extraordinary lengths during the first Russian occupation of Poland (1939-1941) when Jews, who comprised a distinct ethnic minority, were consciously kept out of Polish and Ukrainian assemblies. 'It is known that when Jewish Communists were nominated by Jewish workers, the Soviet authorities intervened and advised withdrawal of the Jewish candidates and (their) replacement by Ukrainians. In Lvov, whose population is 30 per cent. Jewish, only two Jews were elected to the local Soviet of 160 members.'

With the partition of Poland between Stalin and Hitler, large numbers of Jews fled to the East before the advancing German army. Not only did many of these Jews find their way into Siberian concentration camps, but unknown thousands were turned back for one reason or another to perish in the crematoria of occupied Poland. The Germans actually found Stalin's behaviour reprehensible. A message from Keitel complains that the expulsion of Jews into Russian Poland 'did not proceed as smoothly as had apparently been expected. In practice, the procedure was, for example, that at a quiet place in the woods, a thousand Jews were expelled across the Russian border; fifteen kilometers away, they came back, with the Russian

¹ Cf. Solomon Schwarz, 'Jews in the Soviet Union', Syracuse University Press, 1951.

² Ibid, pp. 299-300.

³ *Jewish Telegraphic News*, Jewish Telegraphic Agency, 25th February, 1940.

commander trying to force the German one to readmit the group'.⁴ The fate of these Jews is not difficult to imagine. A year or two later, many perished in the infamous extermination camps of Hans Frank's 'Government General'. The Russians, who were certainly in a better position than anyone else in Europe to know the directions of Hitler's policies toward the Jews, failed to lift a finger on behalf of European Jewry, unless it was to transport Jews to the extermination camps of the MVD.

When the Nazis invaded Russia, Stalin's policy toward the Jews in no way changed from what it was earlier. Despite the organization of the Jewish Anti-Fascist Committee in Moscow, the Stalinists did surprisingly little to rescue even Russian Jews from the S.S. As Nazi divisions approached major cities in the Baltic states and the Ukraine, cities where Jews were concentrated in large numbers, Russian troops almost invariably departed without making any provisions to remove the Jewish population. Schwarz cites cases where the army actually obstructed the escape of Jews from Latvia and Lithuania. In Russia proper, many of the Jews did not know what to expect from a German invasion. Isolated from their brethren in the West, they were never warned of the intentions that lay behind Hitler's anti-Semitic programme. Many even thought they would prefer German to Stalinist rule. Those Jews who managed to pull back with the Russian army were later conscripted in large numbers along with other nationalities for slave labour.

It is one of the most telling facts against Stalin's rule that decades after the Russian Revolution anti-Semitism has remained widespread in Russia. The Russian people exhibited greater passivity toward the liquidation of the Jews than any other people under German occupation. This would be difficult to believe if it were not based on Schwarz's careful scrutiny of the facts. 'On the whole,' he observes, 'the number of Jews saved by non-Jews in the Nazi-occupied Soviet areas was appallingly low, perhaps less than one-hundredth of one per cent. of the number of Jews living in this area before the war. This compares very unfavourably with the number of Jews rescued from death by non-Jews in France, Belgium, Holland, and even Poland.'

'That many more Jews were saved in Western Europe may well be ascribed to the lesser ferocity of the Hitlerite terror; the French, Belgians, and Dutch were not, in the eyes of Nazi administrators, sub-human scum, as were the Slavs, and were treated more leniently. The higher cultural level of the Western countries may also have had something to do with this. But none of these reasons applies to Poland. Nazi terror was no less severe in Poland than it was in the Ukraine and White Russia; nor was there a substantial difference in culture between the Polish and the Soviet populations. And yet the number, relative and absolute, of Jews rescued by Poles was much higher than that of Jews rescued by the Soviet people.'⁵ We cannot accept Schwarz's explanation that this indifference originates in the general passivity to which the Russian people have been trained by Stalinism. It seems more to the point to say that Stalinist oppression was so completely wedded to the dark heritage of Czarism that years of

⁴ *Nazi-Soviet Relations*, U.S. State Department, 1949, p. 128.

⁵ Schwarz, *op. cit.*, pp. 317-318.

bombastic 'education' failed to remove, *if it was ever so intended*, the most backward sentiments of the feudal past.

It is not surprising, from this point of view, to find evidence of anti-Semitic feeling not only in German occupied areas but also in the interior of Russia. In provinces as remote as Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Western Siberia, reports from Jewish refugees vividly repeat all of the old ideas which are normally associated with anti-Semitism in the West. Schwarz cites one of several accounts to the effect that the population of Tashkent 'did not greet Jewish evacuees from the Ukraine with particular cordiality. People would say: "Now look at those Jews who came. They all have plenty of money."'

'At first we were well received in the *kolkhoz* we had been brought to,' continues one account. 'The *kolkhoz* farmers thought we were genuine Poles. But when they learned we were Jews, they started a row: "Jews killed Christ. Jews don't fight in the war."'

'In the sheep-raising *kolkhozes* in the Astrakhan region, the members, above all the younger ones [!], would tell you they knew for sure that the Jews were to blame for the war.'

The 'sophisticated' anti-Semitism contained in these remarks is astonishing for a country whose régime claims to have freed it from every vestige of capitalism. The naïve might at least expect a unique brand of 'Soviet' anti-Semitism, but certainly not a sentiment that in every detail exudes the stench of a bourgeois sewer! While it is true that the early Bolsheviks made anti-Semitism a crime, it must be further emphasized that Stalin has since increased all the material conditions for the existence of this crime. Now, he has taken anti-Semitism out of the shadows and given it semi-official expression by overt state actions and propaganda against the Jewish people.

Since January, 1949, it is no longer possible to deny that the Kremlin has singled out the Jewish people for discrimination and liquidation. For years, Stalinism has persecuted the Zionist movement. At present, however, it moves not only against the Hebrew traditions which Zionism emphasizes, but also against Yiddish culture, which the Stalinists once claimed to encourage. Indeed, any semblance of national policy toward the Jews has disappeared. In November, 1948, the political instrument for such a policy — the Jewish Anti-Fascist Committee and its newspaper, *Einikeit* — were liquidated without explanation. 'According to repeated reports,' writes Mr. Joseph Gorden in the authoritative *American Jewish Year Book* for 1950, 'the leaders of the Committee and most of the well-known Yiddish writers were arrested and deported. Among them were Itzik Pfefer, secretary of the Anti-Fascist Committee; L. Goldberg, an editor of *Einikeit*, and the writers Peretz Markish, Nistor, S. Halkin, David Bergelson, Mosche Broderzon, and Leib Kvitko. There was no official announcement about their arrest. But repeated reports of the arrests were never denied; their names disappeared from the press and none of them was mentioned in connection with the pro-Communist "World Congress of Partisans of Peace" held in Paris in April, 1949. The world Communist press answered repeated questions about their fate with either silence or abuse, carefully evading a clear answer.'

* Ibid. p. 346.

'At the same time, the Yiddish almanac, *Shtern*, in the Ukraine was discontinued on the charge that it was "cultivating nationalist feelings". No Yiddish periodicals were left in the Soviet Union, except possibly in Birobidjan.'

The same year saw the initiation of the infamous campaign against 'cosmopolitanism'. More than two-thirds of the victims who were liquidated proved to be Jews. 'Whatever the primary intent of the campaign,' continues Gorden, 'its result was a drastic purge of a great part of the Soviet Jewish intelligentsia. In addition, the adjectives used to describe the victims . . . were reminiscent of the stereotypes employed in anti-Jewish propaganda, and probably reinforced anti-Semitic prejudices. There were repeated insinuations that such people were not able to properly understand Russian national character and that Russian national pride was "alien" to them.' The combined campaign against specifically Jewish institutions and 'cosmopolitans' had led to the complete extirpation of Jewish culture in Russia.

But by far the most incredible situation is the mass liquidation of the Jews as a people. It is now known that Jewish people as such are being sent to Siberia by the hundreds of thousands. The existence of this programme can no longer be denied. It is a policy of sheer genocide.

'During the summer of 1949,' reports Gorden, 'the Jewish press outside the Soviet Union carried a number of reports about the mass deportations of Jews from the Western border regions of the Soviet Union, especially from White Russia, the Ukraine, Eastern Galicia, Bukovina, and Bessarabia. According to one report, the deportations affected mainly those Jewish citizens who had relatives in America or Western Europe; other sources maintained that the whole Jewish population of some territories was being deported. The reports described, often in great detail, how the secret police rounded up the Jews, put them on deportation trains, and sent them off to unknown destinations, presumably Siberia or the Arctic regions of European Russia. One report asserted that 30,000 Jews had been deported from Lwow (Lemberg) and other cities of former Polish Eastern Galicia, and that the whole region was now free of Jews. Another dispatch described similar proceedings in an unnamed Ukrainian city. Indirect evidence of the veracity of these reports was seen in the fact that Polish Jews who maintained correspondence with their relatives in the Ukraine and White Russia ceased to receive answers and their letters were returned with the comment: "Returned to sender, addressee has left."'

The best information has thus far been obtained from the satellite countries, where some communication with the outside world has not entirely ceased. In Rumania, for example, an estimated 350,000 Jews, the largest Jewish community among the satellite countries, survived the Nazi 'solution'. It is a matter of the gravest significance that the government statistically enumerates as Jews only 138,795 Yiddish-speaking people and has 'neglected' to disclose the number of individuals who profess the Jewish faith or who describe themselves as ethnically affiliated to the Jewish people. More than half of the estimated Jewish community has thus been removed from the census figures!

The economic position of the Rumanian Jews has completely deteriorated. The nationalization decrees virtually wiped out all the assets of the Jewish

community leaving, according to some reports, 80 per cent. of Rumanian Jewry without any regular source of livelihood. This situation compares only with the plight of the German Jews after the vom Rath assassination in the 'thirties. The parallel to Nazism traced by the Stalinists in subsequent events is uncanny. In 1948, almost the entire network of Rumanian Jewish organizations was dissolved, despite the fact that they had been taken over by Stalinists for the most part. This was followed in January, 1949, by the dissolution of the entire Zionist movement. Even the so-called 'Jewish Democratic Committees', a completely Stalinist outfit in origins and aims faces liquidation. A number of these committees have already been purged on the excuse that they have not effectively carried out the anti-Zionist measures of the government. We may assume they will be permitted to remain until the liquidation of Rumanian Jewry has been completed.

The mounting pleas for emigration give an indisputable picture of the fear and hardship under which the Rumanian Jews now live. 'On February 11-13, 1949,' reports Gorden, 'rumours were spread in Bucharest that the Israeli legation was conducting large-scale registration of applicants for emigration. Thousands of Jews jammed the street around the building and applications were handed in by the basketful. Applicants appeared even on Saturday when the office was closed, and threw their appeals through the gates. Legation officials, however, explained that no mass registration was planned and that they could not explain the origin of the rumours. On February 14, 1949, a spontaneous demonstration by an estimated 10,000 Jews took place in the streets near the legation. Crowds gathered to celebrate the opening of the Israeli Constituent Assembly and to demand free emigration; they danced in the streets near the legation and shouted "Long live Israel!" and "Aliyah!" On February 17, 1949, rumours again circulated that 100,000 Jews would be allowed to emigrate. Several thousand Jews gathered in front of the legation. The crowd shouted for emigration papers.' The Rumanian government answered these demonstrations by arresting several Israeli citizens who had come to help organize the emigration of Jews to Israel. The ban against leaving Rumania remained in effect.

A worse situation exists in Hungary, perhaps only because more facts have been obtained. As in Rumania, Hungarian Jewry were virtually stripped of all their material resources by the government's nationalization programme. According to Bela Fabian, writing in *Commentary*, October, 1951, the vast majority of expropriated retail businesses and buildings belonged to Jews. Hundreds of Jewish lawyers were disbarred for political reasons. Many of these expropriated individuals were later picked up by the police for 'vagrancy' and transported to the concentration camp of Kistarcsa. Jewish organizations were either disbanded or forcibly merged into Stalinist-controlled movements. 'The Jewish community, bound, destitute and cut off from emigration, now awaited the last stage in the tragedy,' writes Fabian. 'It was not long in coming.'

On 5th November, 1950, visitors to the Kistarcsa camp suddenly discovered that hundreds of Jewish inmates had simply disappeared. A similar situation was reported by visitors to the Vesto concentration camp. Seven months later 'a wave of evictions and expulsions began in Budapest. On twenty-four hours' notice, or less,' writes Fabian, 'anyone was liable to eviction. In a single month, nine to ten thousand Jews (together with about

as many non-Jews) were removed from their homes and sent to small villages in Eastern Hungary. Panic seized Budapest Jews, as reflected by the flood of desperate letters received by Americans of Hungarian origin — over real as well as assumed, names and addresses. For since people were now being punished for what they were — intellectuals, former businessmen and professionals, "international" Jews (without evidence of disloyalty or "international" connections) — it hardly mattered what they did . . . Hungarian Jews did not doubt their ultimate destination was Soviet Russia: "The persons evicted from Budapest are crowded into cattle cars at the suburban stations. Many police agents handle them roughly, as they did in Nazi days; others, themselves disgusted, show more compassion and often have tears in their eyes. . . ." The parallel to the policy of Nazi extermination is almost complete: the only difference is the denial that "Jews as Jews" are being mistreated, and the fact that, at the end of the line, instead of the extermination camps of Auschwitz and Treblinka, there are the slave labour camps of Karaganda and Kolyma and cotton fields of Tashkent and Alma-Ata.'

This 'difference' between the Nazis and Stalinists is less than Fabian believes. The proportion of Jews to non-Jews who are finding themselves deported is far in excess of the normal ratio in Hungary. Their departure has been preceded by a vigorous campaign against 'cosmopolitans' which clearly, at least in Russia, serves to single out the Jews from the rest of the population. It is important to note that economically useful slave labour is not the only motive behind the current round-ups in Hungary. Why, asks Fabian, for example, 'were so large a proportion of the deportees aged persons useless for labour?' The question answers the fate of these victims. Nearly all are certain to perish without so much as providing real assets to Stalin's slave programme. Objectively speaking, and for whatever reasons can be adduced (the causes for genocide have been examined by this writer in No. 10 of *Contemporary Issues**), the Kremlin is destroying the Jewish people of Eastern Europe who remained after the Nazi 'final solution'.

This policy has not been without its echo in Yugoslavia, where the Titoist dictatorship presides over the destiny of some six thousand Jews. Indeed, Stalinist anti-Semitism has assumed such a furious character that Titoist policy toward the Yugoslav Jews, which ordinarily would have earned bitter condemnation, now seems benign by contrast. No one, however, would seriously regard Belgrade's practices as favourable or conducive to the perpetuation of Jewish community life in Yugoslavia.

When the Nazi holocaust was swept out of this tortured Balkan country, it was found that 14,000 out of 80,000 Jews survived the occupation. This proportion of survival is amongst the highest in Eastern Europe and speaks well for the protection which the Yugoslav people gave to their Jewish citizens. Apparently the Yugoslav Jews and their non-Jewish brethren were on such good terms that when the 'Anglo-American Commission of Inquiry on Problems of Jews in Europe' visited Yugoslavia a year after the war, it was reported that the overwhelming majority of Jews wished to remain in their homeland and participate in Yugoslav life. Only 2,750 Jews elected to emigrate to Palestine and 550 wished to go to other countries.

* 'A Social Study of Genocide.'

After three years of Titoist rule, however, an astonishing change took place. When Tito consented to permit emigration to Israel, 'a great majority of the remaining Jews decided to leave the country.' Between December, 1948, and the Fall of 1949, about half of the Jewish community emigrated. The majority of those who remained behind were essentially people in technical professions whom the Titoist régime compelled to remain in totalitarian Yugoslavia. There can be very little doubt that if Tito had continued his cordial ties with the Kremlin, these Yugoslav Jews would have also found their way into Siberian concentration and slave labour camps. This is implied in the restrained account of Mr. Gorden's article on Yugoslavia in the *American Jewish Year Book* of 1952. Writes Mr. Gorden: 'Thanks to Yugoslavia's breaking with the Soviet Union in the summer of 1948, just before the campaign against Zionism and "Jewish nationalism" was launched in Russia and all the satellite countries, the Yugoslav Jews escaped the persecution suffered by their coreligionists in those lands.' As things stand, Tito followed much of the policy against the Yugoslav Jewish community that Stalin is now completing in countries occupied by the Kremlin. According to a report by Mr. Richard Yaffe in the *Zionist Review* of 3rd March, 1950, virtually no Jewish life exists in Yugoslavia. Belgrade, which has the second largest Jewish community in Yugoslavia, must suffice with the service of only one rabbi, and 'when Yaffe visited the synagogue during the Shevuot holidays, it was difficult to get a *minyan* [prayer quorum] together.' It would be too convenient to suppose, as Mr. Gorden seems to suggest, that this arises from a lack of religious enthusiasm among Yugoslav Jewry. Indeed, the reader is cordially asked to imagine that out of some 2,000 Jews reported to be in Belgrade, ten could not be found to compose a quorum! And yet, when the Yugoslav Jews were permitted to contribute to a fund-raising campaign for Israel in November, 1949, 4,500,000 dinars were collected.

It must be asserted under these circumstances that Tito, who poses as a defender of national rights, is extirpating Jewish life in Yugoslavia. While Tito is not using the technique of Stalin in every detail, he undoubtedly has followed this technique in many respects. The Jewish Community is indubitably in fear of acknowledging its memorable cultural and religious ties with Jewry as a whole. Although inarticulate under the Belgrade régime, it now manifests its antipathy for the Titoist iron heel wherever the opportunity for emigration presents itself. The régime has reciprocated this hostility by depriving all Jewish emigrants of their property and permitting them to take only personal belongings.

* * *

Some comment is necessary on the way in which the situation of the Jewish people under Stalinist and Titoist rule is being handled not only in the bourgeois press, but especially by Jewish leaders and organizations whose responsibility it is to articulate the plight of these people. There is a suprising tendency to overlook the full meaning of Stalin's policy toward the East European Jews. The bourgeois press, of course, gives the above-mentioned facts only incidental reportage. The Yiddish and English-

¹ *American Jewish Year Book*, p. 348.

² *Ibid*, p. 349.

speaking Jewish press, while of late including an abundance of material, was slow to dwell upon the problem and to this day has generally failed to draw a satisfactory parallel between Hitler's and Stalin's behaviour toward the Jews. The Nazis, it is recognized, followed a policy of extermination against Jews *per se*. But the Kremlin is usually described as conducting an ideological struggle in Eastern Europe which is supposed to involve a large portion of Jews because of their middle-class background and 'ties with the West'. In so many words, Stalin is often not believed to be manipulating and destroying the Jews on the same economic and social grounds that guided German fascism. Russia is not regarded as carrying forward an anti-Semitic policy; neither is it seen to be promoting traditional sentiments against the Jews in the East; and where the Jews are being confined in slave labour camps, a distinction is still being drawn between a programme of extermination and one of economic exploitation.

A typical illustration of this frame of mind is an open letter which Hayim Greenberg addressed to the Russian ambassador in the pages of the *Jewish Frontier* (February, 1951). Writes Mr. Greenberg:

'I do not believe that the Soviet Jews are faced with any physical or economic danger. The Soviet Union has granted equal rights — as it understands the term "rights" — to all peoples and tribes within its borders. This is a significant achievement. Recently there has been considerable talk about Soviet anti-Semitism, but the authenticity of the information on which these accusations were based seems to be rather uncertain. Naturally, I do not believe that there are no cases of Jew-hatred in the Soviet Union. No region in the world is completely free of this madness. It exists in America, in Europe, and Eurasia is no doubt also not free from it. I recall the Jew-hatred that existed among the Russian people in the early days of the Soviet régime when I was still there, and I hardly think that this malady has been completely cured in the intervening years. Moreover, the beastly behaviour of certain elements of the Soviet people toward the Jews during the Nazi occupation demonstrates how deeply ingrained this malady is. But I am aware that anti-Semitic feelings still existing in the Soviet Union are frowned upon and discouraged, that the Soviet Government as such is not anti-Semitic and never embarked on policies of anti-Jewish discrimination, despite the fact that from time to time some Soviet luminaries are guilty of extreme bad taste and tactlessness that easily lend themselves to interpretation as anti-Semitism. My main complaint against the Soviet Union on this score is that it has boasted too frequently and too loudly of its fairness to the Jews. An honest citizen does not have to wear a medal testifying to the fact that he is not a horse thief, and a self-respecting government should not boast too much of the fact that it does not tolerate pogroms.'

Mr. Greenberg then goes on to lament that his fears rest in an entirely different direction. He is concerned that the cultural and religious ties rendering individual Jews into a community are being destroyed. It is the destruction of these ties that he interprets as genocide; and he warns the Russian ambassador that if no reply is forthcoming, he — Hayim Greenberg — and the American Jewish Community will be obliged to draw the following conclusion:

'We will then have no choice but to conclude that the Soviet is practising

Genocide toward the Jewish community, that it is determined to obliterate the Jewish people as such, to eradicate the last spark of Jewish group-consciousness. We will be forced to conclude that even though the individual Jew is permitted to survive biologically, "the Socialist Fatherland" has no room for Jewish group existence and for Jewish values. We here are unable to grasp the motives impelling the Soviet Government toward such a policy of obliteration. But facts are facts even if we do not know the reasons or the idiosyncrasies that cause them.'

The above example of literary cretinism is from the pen of one of the foremost spokesmen of American Zionism. It follows about two years after *Pravda's* campaign against 'cosmopolitanism' and a year after much of the data cited in this article was published in the *American Jewish Year Book*. What may be forgiven, however, in private correspondence between Mr. Hayim Greenberg and the Russian ambassador is unpardonable in an open letter for public consumption. For the entire issue is treated in a completely supine and obscurantist manner. While it is true that the word *Gleichschaltung* has a Russian equivalent and was put into practice before Hitler became Reichfuehrer, Stalin has had less to fear from Jewish nationalism and the Hebrew *Kulturgeist* than from the national aspirations of any other people under Kremlin rule. Indeed, the Stalinist régime has tried to distinguish the Jewish community from other peoples after much of this community was coerced into complete submission. It has revived the Jewish names of its victims (about which, incidentally, Greenberg says absolutely nothing in his 'Open Letter') after many of them integrated themselves into the national framework of the countries in which they lived. This fact became evident very recently in *Paffaire Slansky*, when a prominent Czech Stalinist was not only depicted as a Jew long after he abdicated all connection with his people, but his Jewish origins were the occasion for a vituperative attack by Prime Minister Zapotocky against 'international Jerusalem'. Even in the ideological sphere, the point is that Stalin has revived anti-Semitism, not suppressed *Yiddishkeit*.

The tendency to ignore Stalinist practice for Stalinist ideology (slender as this ideology now pretends to be) assumes very crass form in the behaviour of Mapam spokesmen. This Israeli 'labour' party, whose professions of 'socialism' include a detestable white-wash of Stalinist barbarism toward the Jewish people, has accepted the Kremlin's anti-Semitism as the form of Stalin's liquidation of 'bourgeois' elements in Russian economic life. While Mapam does not approve of this policy as it applies to the Jews, it 'understands' the 'mistaken zeal' that lies behind the policy. Mapam so completely promotes this ideological covering that it has found itself unforgiving of 'collective guilt' in Western Germany but remains prepared to accept 'atonement' from Eastern Germany. At the same time, for instance, that the deputies of this totalitarian caricature in the Knesset are indignant over the 'reparations' negotiations between Bonn and Israel, Mr. Mordecai Oren, a Mapam representative to the Stalinist World Federation of Trade Unions, expresses his belief to a Berlin audience that the German workers will restore the honour of the German people 'with the generous help of the great Soviet Union and the wise leadership of Stalin'.

At a time when public interest in Russian anti-Semitism may be carried away by what is being reported and done to arrest this well-advanced (and,

actually, little opposed) policy of the Kremlin, it is appropriate to examine the limits of the protest and publicity directed against Russian anti-Semitism. In the first place, as we have already pointed out, the American English-speaking Jewish press was very slow in picking up the issue. It was primarily the Yiddish press, confined to an ever-diminishing number of readers, that maintained a sustained coverage of the facts. Secondly, after taking up the issue, this English-speaking Jewish press has not given it more coverage or emphasis than the question of German anti-Semitism. This is suspect because Germany to-day can no longer be singled out as an immediate factor in the Jewish problem. The reaction of the press is an effluvia of moralizing and psychologizing about 'collective guilt', about issues that are determined not by the objective problems of the Jewish people, but by the policies of American imperialism. In short, the American English-speaking Jewish press has divided the emphasis that the whole anti-Semitic issue deserves by sharing it equally between Russian and German anti-Semitism. It has been so occupied with the German as against the Stalinist aspects of the problem that it kept the former in the foreground until the past year or two, and only recently shares attention between both . . . yet, without shifting the emphasis from a past to a present problem.

To the knowledge of this writer, Russian anti-Semitism has not even produced the same type of reaction that was produced by German practices in 1944 and 1945. When one considers the public demonstrations, pleas to the Allied authorities, the deluge of literature and irate speeches which emanated from Jewish leaders and organizations in the last years of the war, the present efforts to draw attention to the Russian exterminations now seem minuscule. Even the protests against German genocide came too late to help European Jewry during its most difficult tribulations. For example: a survey letter by the editors of *Contemporary Issues* requesting information on data and protest action conducted yielded a very poor response. Out of 450 letters mailed in 1952 to all leading American Jewish organizations and periodicals, only ten answers and one telephone communication were received at this writing, weeks after inquiry. *The National Jewish Monthly* and *Jewish Social Studies* refused to give *Contemporary Issues* any information without first acquiring information about the source of inquiry. The 'Workmen's Circle' referred the editors to the 'Jewish Labour Committee' which has published considerable material on the issue but neglected to reply. *Commentary* referred to five articles on Russian anti-Semitism as compared to an equal if not greater number on Germany. The *Jewish Telegraphic Agency* and *Jewish Times* advised the editors to examine library collections of their dispatches and press. The 'American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee' disclaimed any involvement in 'any kind of political activity' and professed to be occupied with 'rebuilding lives for destitute Jews throughout the world'. It thus did not supply information although representatives of the J.D.C. in Hungary during the last war negotiated with the Nazis and were a source of vital information about the fate of the East European Jews. The *Jewish Frontier*, which speaks for the Mapai Zionist ideology in the United States replied with three magazines, including the 'Open Letter' of Hayim Greenberg. The 'World Jewish Congress' sent the editors a report entitled: 'Rumanian

Jewry in the Post War World,' depicting in some detail the fate of these Jews under German and Stalinist rule. Neither the American Yiddish newspapers nor a single Zionist organization (unless the *Jewish Frontier* can be regarded as such) replied. Except for *The Reconstructionist*, none of the periodicals, large fraternal movements, invested money-collecting agencies, bureaucracies, job holders and moral eunuchs (again, with the exception of those mentioned) that have saddled themselves on the back of the American Jewish community either reported or acted on the destruction of East European Jewry . . . or were sufficiently interested, if they had done so, to give the issue a wider dissemination in the pages of *Contemporary Issues* after a reply had been expressly solicited for this purpose. It would not seem to be a question of whether *Contemporary Issues* is a large or small periodical, or who its supporters or what its purposes are. The destruction of East European Jewry is now being completed by Stalin. It has received only occasional reportage in the non-Jewish press and remains little known to the world at large. The sole issue is: the dissemination of this information — all the more because there has been no demonstrative action comparable to the mass rallies that occurred toward the end of the last war, when German genocide was *permitted* to become well-known.

The reaction of the Jewish organizations is not commensurate with the issue. The current dilution of anti-Semitism in Russia with the 'collective guilt' of the German people is to be lamented primarily because it throws a shadow on an immediate problem. We may hazard the explanation that this dilution follows — whether consciously or not — current American policy, even where this ranges into the propagandistic sphere. Despite the volume of noise to the contrary, Washington places a greater premium on justifying its control of Germany than on alleged 'differences' with Russia. This control can only acquire validity if world opinion is constantly 'reminded' that the German people are still 'obsessed' by 'dreams of world conquest', that they remain under the influence of Nazi aspirations and anti-Semitic feeling. On the other hand, 'cold war' propaganda manages to avoid some of the most important realities of the Russian scene, to a point where information unfavourable to the Stalinist régime has been suppressed for years and much of it continues in all probability to repose in the various archives of the government.* From this vantage point, it may be well to question how seriously can be regarded the current exposure of Stalinist anti-Semitism by many Jewish organizations and periodicals.

April, 1952.

* Consider the following: During the war, documents relating to Russian slave labour were captured from the Nazis which the latter, in turn, had captured from the Russians. This data was not released to the public until six years after the war. Moreover, reports to the U.S. Government on the Katyn massacre were concealed until this year, when a 'sensational', 'colossal' Hollywood-like series of hearings were held in Washington by a Congressional committee. Similar cases can be reported and more will probably come to light as time goes on to show that information about Russia of great public interest is concealed by Washington.

Charles Graham

THE SIGNIFICANCE OF EISENHOWER

THE United States is again going through the quadrennial political paroxysm of a presidential election. The portentousness of this usually empty habit has already been made manifest in its first formal stage — the primary election. The grand rôle assigned to this first stage — allowing the people themselves to choose who shall be a candidate for presidential office — has, in fact, never been played. The primary election is essentially engineered within the framework of big established machine-controlled party blocs, who alone decide which candidate will appear before the voters. The real decisions are, of course, made at the party conventions, not determined by “popular” choice but by the relative power of the various factional machines. The “horse-trading”, the jockeying for position and patronage in the “secret smoke-filled small hotel-room” are well-known phenomena associated with the convention “choice”.

It is naturally part of the game, to capture “popular” support, for the favorite sons of the various blocs to exaggerate small differences in policy out of all proportion to their significance or, when this will not suffice, as now, to manufacture them out of the circumambient air. In their zeal to discomfit one another, it is true that a hem of the veil is occasionally lifted and a flash of the real issues escapes. Thus the people have snared a glimpse of corruption in high places (despite its extent, still a glimpse) which includes both major parties. Together with strident denunciations of the completely airy Stalinist menace, there are weak words on sundry trifles, the increasing tax burden and the evils of inflation. The war-time hopes for a better life, the concern over conscription, the uneasiness over the waning remnants of democratic rights, the strangely interminable negotiations in Korea, the shady imperialist deals, all are left in silence or covered by the yelping of the yellow dog press.

Yet, behind the pretentious façade of “politics as usual”, some fundamental currents and tendencies are working themselves out. The forces grouped about the enigmatic figure of Eisenhower are driving to a new stage. The decisive fact underlying all political manoeuvring is the extreme centralization of the economy of the United States. This centralization, which has gone further than in Germany under Hitler, has yet to be matched on the social and political scene. The disparity between monopolization in the economy and democracy in society was resolved in Germany by Nazism and Hitler. But not even Hitler could brashly encounter a democratic order as long as there remained any vitality to it. The function of corroding away the already weak resistance of the Weimar democracy had to be entrusted to certain predecessors of Hitler.

The Bruning, Schleicher and Von Papen régimes of pre-Hitler Germany have been correctly characterized as Bonapartist. These men arrogated

to themselves, to an unusual degree, the above-the-struggle aspect of the State. It is the usual function of the State to appear as an impartial force above the antagonistic classes in society while operating in the interest of the economically dominant class. But there eventually arrive periods when the antagonism threatens to break its usual bounds and become an open war for supremacy. During this period when neither side is yet prepared or able to vanquish its opponent, there tends to be thrown up an individual who, in himself, becomes the Arbiter for all of society . . . a Bonapartist. This Arbiter continues, in his own person, the rôle of the State. Chief amongst his tasks, when the two camps paralyze each other, is to make the decisions which thus prevent a premature clash, even if this entails alienating individuals or sections of the class in whose interest he rules. In the course of restraining his own friends, he systematically weakens the entire spectrum of forces arrayed against them. Such were the men who preceded Hitler — Brüning, Schleicher and Von Papen.

It is now the turn of the United States to bring accord between the high degree of monopolization in the economy and the continuing democracy in the social and political arena. For the interim struggle, which may endure for some time before the open clash, the man of the hour seems to be already chosen — Eisenhower.

That Eisenhower has indeed been chosen is established best by his political "opponents". It is, by now, an open secret that Eisenhower was offered the Democratic Party nomination. Nor should it be ignored that, subsequent to his refusal, Truman, the only man who constituted a threat to Eisenhower's election from within the ranks of the Democratic organization, has withdrawn. And it is also interesting to observe that Truman does nothing to unify his own party behind a real contender against Eisenhower. Nay, he even takes steps to drive his more retrogressive supporters into the other camp. This, aside from the tremendous ballyhoo which has been building Eisenhower for years through all the various and inescapable propaganda mechanism at the command of the class he represents. In addition must be reckoned the stupid or conscious, or both, assistance rendered to Candidate Eisenhower by Candidate Taft. That Taft appears as the principal obstacle within the Republican Party to Eisenhower's nomination cannot be gainsaid. But that there is a significant difference in views between the two men is a fiction to which Taft contributes more than his share. Witness the questions Taft poses for Eisenhower in a comic-play of pressure to break the General's silence. As though it were not known that the present foreign policy is one with which Eisenhower agrees and for which he has been a most effective instrument. As though Eisenhower could possibly object to all that is consequently entailed for domestic policy. As though Taft himself does have or could have a fundamental policy at variance with the present orientation of the government.

In this last respect Taft is but representative of many political figures to-day who live on the false traditions and illusory hopes of an earlier day. Behind the tattered banner of "ISOLATIONISM", borne by Taft, Hoover and their demagogic brothers, marches a ragged army of light manufacturers, small shopkeepers, farmers, middle-class consumers and tired radicals befuddled by their own theories, who end up to their great dismay in — Korea. And once again is underlined the prime lesson of the day — under

the present system no other road can be permitted than toward world domination and domestic totalitarianism. Current history has established beyond question that the "Old Guard", the "conservatives", the "reactionaries" have been pushed aside; leadership is no longer for them. Thus when Taft attempts to demarcate himself from the main trend and can only mumble empty criticism of official policy he, too, helps to "choose" the "Man on the White Horse". If these dying relics are to be assigned a rôle at all, it is to hasten the eventual *dénouement*. Between the weighty currents who determine policy and these fumbling dissidents, there is in fact an excellent division of labor. Note, for example, Hoover's proposal, endorsed in his own way by Taft, but impossible to produce in official quarters, to yield Europe to Stalin. (Taft, in his stupidity or irresponsibility, yields Asia also, not understanding the limits of the digestion of the Stalinist monster.) Note also, the *Taft-Hartley* law for which the administration is embarrassed but grateful.

It is precisely to avoid such embarrassment, such commitments, that Eisenhower stands forth, with the co-operation of all, as a man without a record. The most obvious and significant fact about the political figure of Eisenhower is that he has no politics — or so it appears. All the hypocritical arts of diplomatic double-talk have been employed not only to avoid a political position but to erase whatever indications of one may have been previously given. This alone reveals characteristics of the "popular general" which qualify him for the rôle of Arbiter in no small degree. Far more than any preceding politician, this man has effectively concealed his views. His capacity exceeds even that arch-hypocrite and deceiver-of-the-people Franklin D. Roosevelt. And just as with Roosevelt, who found it necessary to lie to the nation in order to take the country into war, so with Eisenhower, the deception over political views is not accidental. To assume the office of the Presidency and fill it with a new and unusual content, that man is best who presents himself untrammelled by the trappings and encumbrances of the past. It is surely for this reason that Eisenhower is not cast in the mantle of the Democratic Party. The Democratic Party has been in power for twenty years and, though this in itself constitutes a confirmation of the bankruptcy of the old schools of politics gathered for the most part in the Republican ranks, it has accumulated ties and traditions which are ill adapted for the new course.

The new course which bids fair to be inaugurated by Eisenhower differs from the old in but one decisive respect — tempo. Herein lies the harsh reality. To every politically alive person in the United States there has come in recent years a sense of impending dangers, of tension in the atmosphere. The indications are manifold: the increasing concern over civil liberties and the consequent gain in membership by the civil liberties organizations; the great dissatisfaction with the Korean "police action" and the consequent high rate of defections among draftees plus a constant search for a way out amongst those not yet called; the lack of public disapproval for the "evaders" as evidenced in the last war; the decreasing popularity of the "glamorous" air force and the outright refusal to fly by men called back into the armed forces; the strange "softness" of the "big brass" in disciplining these men accompanied by open statements from such public writers as Hansen Baldwin that this is not just an incident but

a "problem"; the open scandal over taxation which is evinced not merely by the corruption displayed amongst officials, but by a universal hunt to avoid the insensate and crushing burden. ("We have become a nation of tax evaders," says an article in a magazine of nationwide circulation.) But more important than all else is the increasing recognition that the administrative apparatus of government encroaches ever more deeply and extensively upon social and individual existence. (To the extent that Taft secures "popular" support at all, it is due to his limited expression of the general concern over such things.) The bureaucratization of all public activity, law established by ukase, the increasing ineptitude and ineffectualness of Congress, which has become almost nothing more than a talking shop, and above all the militarization of the country in which the armed forces are becoming transformed from an adjunct of the apparatus to a real social base in the economy — these are the hallmarks of the era and foreshadow the coming period.

That Eisenhower embodies all that has gone before is attested not only by the well-known support, both political and personal, that he has extended to the aim of American monopolists of dominating the world. There are also such "trifles" as Eisenhower's endorsement of negro segregation, his support of the theft of the tideland oil resources from the country, his membership in an organization on record in favor of a national sales tax. In themselves these positions are not decisive but they serve to delineate the character of the man who is most likely to accede to the Presidency, a man who is rooted completely in the interests of the dominant and most retrogressive elements of the country. But Eisenhower brings something else to the office of the President — his own personal background and predilections. "Ike" Eisenhower is a man with no trace of cultural background, a military man publicly branded by favored and favorable biographers as not having read a book in years, unless one is willing to accord the dignity of a book to pulp Westerns. He is reported as having for childhood hero that Cincinnatus, "twice called to the dictatorship of Rome", and who, incidentally, was used to name that patrician Order which played so prominent a rôle in having the American constitution adopted in order to protect its property. He has learned his politics and acquired his ideas through the medium of military channels, where the concept of government is necessarily modelled on the "Articles of War". He is blood brother to the entire camarilla of the High Command which has been extending itself since the war into dominating civilian rôles without severing its military connections. "Nothing is more conducive to arbitrary rule than the military junta," declares a ranking compatriot of Eisenhower.

It is from the wedding of the character and background of the man to the tendencies inherent in the situation that will flow the intensification and hastening of what has gone before. And this, in itself, will give the period a qualitatively different nature. Congress will become increasingly impotent. Rule by ukase will become the rule. Decisions will rest to a greater and greater degree in the hands of the Arbiter. So powerful is this tendency that it is even manifest with the mediocre figure of Truman who already attempts to settle matters such as the steel strike by patently unusual methods. Under Eisenhower the drive toward extraparliamentary measures and anticonstitutional steps will achieve additional strength; he himself posing as above all

factions, above all issues, "The General" summoned to politics, the public servant who devoted himself to administrative duties then called "in a time of peril" to the aid of the nation.

The structure of American government is particularly prone to the "legal" extrusion of the "strong" man. So thoroughly have time and the original founders of the State concentrated power into the hands of the "executive" that the tools for fascization, *cold* fascization as compared to the rise of Stalin, Hitler and Mussolini, are ready to hand. It is not a mere excursion into history by the press to-day when it revives President Jackson's phrase about a Congressman: "He has passed his law, now let him enforce it." The only recourse a Congress may have against a "strong" President is impeachment and removal from office. This is a firmness and vitality no longer residing in that increasingly supine body especially when the greater part of its members can see no other hope than "the General". And what of the day when a President remarks: "They have passed their impeachment, now let them enforce it."

Human development knows no smooth course. It is replete with accidents, diversions and unforeseen complications. Eisenhower may indeed never be President of the United States. Innumerable secondary and tertiary configurations in the pattern may contravene. But the *significance* of this figure at the center of the stage is unmistakable. Behind the Bonapartist "smiling personality" and "efficient administrator" the course of events is laying down a critical fork in the road. One leads with certainty to a fascization, which, by reason of the traditionless, cultureless, brutal and violent nature of American society, will turn the torture-mills of Siberia into the background by comparison. However, despite enormous pressure in this direction, it has still to be determined. Tremendous forces operate against it. The discord between economic monopoly and bourgeois democracy has lasted longer in the United States than it did in Germany. Nor does the task of the monopolists grow easier with time. Germany and Russia encountered special situations and thereby were permitted to prepare *openly* for fascism which meant for Germany (unlike Italy) to achieve the goal of German monopoly or to — perish.

The classical form of fascism which was brought into existence in Germany will never be seen again. Enthusiasm for fascism cannot be raised again on any scale — the victims have learned the lesson. But also the rulers! Fascization goes on under cover the "struggle against fascism", for the "preservation of freedom", requiring "strong measures". So deep has the lesson penetrated that every step toward totalitarianism tends to raise hordes in suspicion. Often, little is needed to transform these *hosts* into enraged armies. The monopolists must tread carefully and slowly. But no matter with what exquisite precision they manoeuvre, the increasing dangers and deprivations must evoke overt reactions from every strata of society. The middle class will not again wait to demand payment on the promises of a victorious American Hitler in a "second revolution" only to be shattered in a bloody "Roehm Purge". The alarm of the small investors, the middle class, the consumption goods manufacturers who perceive a new *Mene Mene Tekel Upharsin*, is already achieving articulate expression. Large minority groups, spread over vast tracts of land which fact in itself inordinately complicates the task of the monopolists, are proving to be

uneasily restive under a vaguely appreciated threat. The fear of official circles is that the concretion of the threat will throw them into motion. Ever more it tends to dawn on general consciousness that *all* classes are oppressed and that there is a common enemy. The desperate position of the American ruling class is such that, in moments of internal peril from the as yet nascent resistance, it may not call upon its class brothers in other countries as did the German ruling class. Long in advance of its possible Hitler, the United States has sown the seeds of that new nationalism whose dragons so contributed to Hitler's fall. Can one imagine great sums and huge armies being gathered in Central and South America to rescue the beleaguered "Colossus of the North", the hated "Gringo"? Europe is fast approaching the same great gratitude to the American "bearer of gifts", Asia is even closer.

The tale of human advance records many times the interference of the million-headed mass when the time had really come. With the exhaustion of the capitalist system on a world scale, the painful lessons of many defeats compel the millions to rise again and find a form for their activity as have all the mass movements at great historical turns.

15th June, 1952.

Post-Convention Note

The "Old Guard" is gone. Perhaps intrigued by his surprising show of strength, Taft attempted to capture the nomination apparently by purely administrative measures. Having thereby succeeded in presenting himself as the first evil to be overcome by the "man of the hour", he was ignominiously wiped away. Through the "furious encounter" our "champion of the people" Eisenhower distinguished himself by a cool, almost indifferent attitude to the struggle. The characteristic lack of enthusiasm of the Bonapartist is already in evidence. It was matched only by the lukewarm interest of the convention delegates who were choosing the "next President". With a calm lack of concern, attention directed to trifles and incidentals, the Arbiter emerges as victor over an opponent defeated in advance. With a platform of principles equally acceptable to himself or his defeated opponent, he begins the apportionment of tasks to his supporters, remaining nonetheless committed to no one and nothing. That his colorless speeches and other weak efforts are justified can be seen in the convention of the Democratic Party wrangling stupidly over fifth-rate figures to lead them to defeat against "the General". If the present course continues, Eisenhower will campaign for election to the Presidency, if he does so at all, more from an acquiescence to tradition than because of the need to counter a political adversary.

20th July, 1952.

HOUSE SOLD OUT

Field-Marshal Earl Alexander, British Minister of Defence . . . told reporters that he was very impressed by what he saw in Korea. "The United States is running a very good show."

Report from Washington, June, 1952.

M. S.
YU
RE
M
For a
(Unit
spirit
distrib
uncer
mons
Mr.
oppo
peop
Fo
again
unter
Sydr
Mr.
Com
Serb
intel
An
have
char
assa
'My
gall
than
mor
men
cam
It
Thu
inci
stat
In
'Tit
pas
con
T
tha
Th
cul
'

M. S. Shiloh

YUGOSLAVIA: WHERE ARE THE REAL WAR CRIMINALS?

MILORAD LUKIC is a thorn in the side of the Titoist dictatorship. For almost two years, he has edited a newspaper in Australia — *Sloga*¹ (Unity) — for Yugoslavs abroad, keeping alive the traditional Yugoslav spirit of resistance against every form of tyranny and oppression. His press, distinguished for its exceptionally high level of sobriety and tone, has unceasingly exposed Stalinism and Titoism for what they are: totalitarian monstrosities based on slave labour. It is unnecessary to agree with all of Mr. Lukic's views to recognize in him an incorrigibly honest and sincere opponent of dictatorship, a fervent patriot cherishing the freedom of his people, and a genuine democrat.

For some time now, the Titoists have been carrying on a losing fight against Lukic in Australia. On one occasion, their position became so untenable that a debate between Mr. Lukic and the Belgrade consul in Sydney 'ended with the recall of the consular official in question', writes Mr. J. B. Polya in a letter to *The Australian Jewish News*. 'His successor, Comrade Gavrilovic, set himself the task of recapturing the good-will of Serbians in this country. This he cannot achieve without eliminating the intellectual leaders of democratic Serbians in Australia.'

After several excursions into propaganda and intimidation, the Titoists have now turned to the most unscrupulous of all devices — blatant character assassination. Mr. Lukic's character, however, is not so easy to assassinate. As he has already observed in correspondence with friends: 'My past life is clear, and there are no dark passages in it.' The most galling device, therefore, seemed to be to describe Lukic as nothing less than a 'war criminal'! Thus, without a shred of evidence, with nothing more to go on than the weight of mere accusation, the Belgrade government simply announced that Lukic, who spent four years in German p.o.w. camps, had been a 'spy' for the Gestapo among his fellow prisoners of war!

It cannot be supposed that even the Titoists take this charge seriously. Thus far they haven't even tried to provide witnesses, documents or incidents to support their 'case' — and this with the aid of a dictatorial state which has followed the traditions of the infamous 'Moscow Trials'. In fact, Lukic's hostility to Nazism is so completely unblemished that the Titoists have never dared to level this freely-used charge against him in the past. Now, five years after Tito published his list of 'war criminals', it is conveniently discovered that Mr. Lukic was in some way omitted.

Titoists in Australia are apparently working on the tried fascist tactic that if slander is repeated often enough, it eventually may have an effect. The charge first received public attention when it was raised at a Jewish cultural meeting by Mr. Sydney D. Einfeld on 16th September. It was

¹ This article was published in *Sloga* (18th January, 1952).

picked up and reported in *The Australian Jewish News* of 21st September. From there, the charge was carried into the Australian Senate by Senator O'Byrne as part of a general criticism of the Government's migration programme. The Australian Minister for Immigration, Mr. Holt, has completely rejected the charge. He observed that 'No evidence has come to hand which would suggest that he (Lukic) was in any way associated with the Gestapo. . . .'

Similar charges, we may observe, have also been conveniently 'discovered' against Mr. Mihailo Rajkovic, formerly a Yugoslav judge. These, too, remain completely unfounded. In connection with both men Mr. Holt had the following to say:

'I would suggest that the questions asked in regard to both Lukic and Rajkovic are of the kind which can do irreparable harm, not only to migration generally but to the individuals concerned. Particularly is this so when the allegations are found to be unevidenced, as in these two cases, and to have been based on reasons which at the very least could be defined as being irresponsible.'

Lukic's activity against all forms of totalitarianism virtually speaks for itself. Expelled by the Nazis when he was in Germany for commercial reasons, Lukic fought in the Royal Army after the invasion of Yugoslavia. When he was taken prisoner, Lukic not only refused attractive offers to return home (unlike thousands of Quislings whom the fascists later recruited) but he persisted in fighting both the Germans and native oppressors of his country. At great peril to his life, he edited a secret manuscript newspaper in a German p.o.w. camp which came to be known among the inmates as the 'Reuter Agency'. He was freed only when his camp was captured by American troops in 1945.

At the outset, freedom for Lukic meant an uncompromising struggle against the new rulers of his country: Stalin and Tito. From occupied Munich he edited an anti-Titoist journal until the devaluation of the German mark deprived him of all capital assets. Later, he went to Australia, continuing his unrelenting fight against the Titoist dictatorship among recently-arrived Yugoslav immigrants. Lukic has since not only earned the hatred of the Belgrade government but also of fascist-minded Yugoslavs. 'When *Sloga* was pleased to report the arrest of the noted Croatian war criminal Artukovic in the U.S.A., the Ustashes protested,' notes Mr. Polya. 'If Mr. Lukic and Artukovic are fellow war criminals, this incident is hard to explain.'

The Titoist charges against Lukic are characteristically totalitarian. At a time when the Belgrade régime is gaining new support from the West, it may be well to reflect that Tito's break with Stalin has not removed by one iota the Stalinoid techniques of 'our new ally'. In fact, these very charges raise an interesting question: who are the *real* Yugoslav war criminals? Where have they found a haven, material wealth and social prestige? Where have the notorious Ustashes, anti-semites and henchmen of Pavelitch and Hitler found succour from an enraged Yugoslav people?

Curiously enough, we are likely to find many of them to-day precisely in Belgrade! It is one of the most ironic but little known facts of post-war history that some of the most notorious instruments of Nazi rule in Yugoslavia have occupied, or continue to occupy, posts in Tito's régime. The

number of such conscious fascists are legion. Toward the end of the war, whole companies of Ustashes found their way into Tito's ranks. To-day, many of these elements are engaged in assassinating numberless democrats who fought both Tito and the Nazis. Basing ourselves on Markham's interesting book, *Tito's Imperial Communism*, we shall herewith confine ourselves to only a few who achieved prominence in the new Titoist galaxy.

1. *Franz Pierts*. Before the German invasion of Yugoslavia, Pierts was an officer in the Royal Yugoslav Army. With the establishment of the Pavelitch régime, Pierts immediately switched his allegiance to the fascists. He soon became, in the words of Markham, 'a major Axis hero, the pride of Mussolini's "Independent Croatia", a favourite of the Wehrmacht, a slayer of Reds. He was especially eager to hobnob with German officers, and by having his pictures featured in Nazi military publications, he brought lustre to his own name as well as renown to Fascist Croatia. Copies of such publications are still available and the military intelligence of America, England, Russia, and other United Nations have in their files pictures of Colonel Pierts, wearing Nazi uniforms and an imperious Nazi smile. He was the perfect type of a ferocious Ustasha Nazi, blindly intolerant, a hater of Yugoslavia, a killer of Serbs.' (p. 195.)

Pierts' name was equivalent to an epithet among free Yugoslavs during the last war. Cursed, despised and hated for the betrayal of his nation, Pierts proved to be a virtual cesspool for all that fascism has come to represent. Under Pavelitch, he quickly acquired recognition and became head of the Nazi-controlled 'Yugoslav' air service.

In 1943, however, when it became evident that Germany was losing the war, the ever-accommodating Pierts switched his services again — this time, to Tito. In less than a year Pierts was busily engaged in training 'Partisans' in North Africa. His devotion to Tito now became as articulate as his earlier devotion to Pavelitch. In the post-war period, while Tito was suppressing all the democratic elements remaining in Yugoslavia, Pierts was promoted to the post of Belgrade Ambassador to Argentina.

2. *Marko Mesitch*. Like Pierts, Marko Mesitch was also an officer in the Royal Army who transferred his allegiance to the Nazi-inspired Pavelitch government when Hitler invaded Yugoslavia. When German armies rolled toward the East, Mesitch commanded Ustasha units on the Russian front. He was with the German army at Stalingrad when Von Paulus surrendered to the Russians. After his capture, Mesitch underwent an extraordinary 'conversion'. With 'a little briefing and a little reorientation, he organized an anti-Nazi Croat brigade and began fighting against the Germans and the Ustashes, getting his picture in another kind of paper, and lining up for a new sort of medal. Eventually the hero got to Yugoslavia, threw his arms around Tito's neck and became a leading Partisan, Liberator, Democrat, Champion of the common man. After swearing three oaths in the year and deserting twice in the middle of war, Mr. Mesitch sat down to excellent American food, strutted about in beautiful uniforms, and raised his arm in clenched-fist salutes to his new leader, whom he called the greatest son of Yugoslavia, as many American "liberals" cheered.' (p. 197.)

3. *Sulejman Filipovitch*. Curiously enough, Sulejman Filipovitch has had somewhat the type of 'career' that the Titoists attempt to attribute to Milorad Lukic. Filipovitch was a Colonel in the Royal Army. Like Lukic,

he was captured and sent to a prisoner-of-war camp. Unlike the editor of *Sloga*, however, Filipovitch's 'Serbian nationalism suddenly vanished. He milled around a while with the thousands of other prisoners, as the Nazis were separating the good Yugoslavs from the bad. The bad, all of whom were Serbs, were sent to prisoner-of-war camps in Germany, while the good were released to help Poglavnik Pavelitch (the fierce Croatian dictator) butcher Serbs and fight Russians. Colonel Filipovitch had no difficulty in convincing the Nazis that he was a good Yugoslav and was released to join the Croat Ustasas.' (p. 198.)

Filipovitch cannot be regarded as the more commonplace type of adherent of Pavelitch. His work was not simply confined to battle fronts and military engagements. On the contrary, a suitable image of Filipovitch's activities can be found in the notorious S.S. Colonel Stroop, who liquidated the Warsaw Ghetto in 1943. Filipovitch led Ustasha detachments into the Yugoslav countryside, taking hostages, torturing and executing defenceless men, women and children ostensibly as reprisals for opposition to the Pavelitch government. His name is still anathema in the villages of Herzegovina, Kordun, Lika and Bosnia. It carries the foul odour of names like Commandant Hoess of Auschwitz, Commandant Kramer of Belsen, and Einsatzgruppenfuehrer Ohlendorf. In short, Filipovitch was a mass murderer.

But Filipovitch found a place in Tito's régime — in fact, a leading career. Extraordinary as it may seem, he actually became a Minister in the Belgrade government after the war!

4. *Ljuba Leontitch*. Perhaps the most generous description of Pierts, Mesitch and Filipovitch would be to accuse them of unscrupulous opportunism when their country lay under the Nazi heel. But Ljuba Leontitch is remembered by the Yugoslav people as a traditional fascist of the 'old school'. The *New Leader*, a Social-Democratic paper in New York, depicts Leontitch as 'the founder of the Yugoslav Fascist organization — Fascist not in any vague or generic sense, but in a precise and specific sense — known as "Orjuna". Leontitch assumed the title of "Veliki Chelnik" (Grand Fuehrer). The organization, founded after Mussolini's march on Rome, was a copy of the Italian Fascist original — it even adopted the black shirt as its uniform. It was used to break up meetings and strikes, and had a special body of storm troopers, who perpetrated deeds of violence. They did much to embitter relations between the Serbs and Croats.' (7th July, 1945.)

Leontitch did not go over to Tito until after the collapse of Italy. Like Filipovitch, Leontitch also found a career in Tito's services — as nothing less than the Belgrade Ambassador to London after the war.

The number of 'repentant' turncoats in the Tito government is considerable. They range from sycophants like Augustinchitch to cynical clergymen like Rittig. These men, available to the highest bidder (preferably totalitarians), have completely blended themselves into the Belgrade apparatus. But perhaps the most significant of them has thus far not been sketched out here. As compared with 'him', the others are trivial pigmies, mere dilettantes.

His name is Josip Broz. For years he was a member of the Yugoslav Communist Party, carefully trained in G.P.U. tactics rather than political

principles. When Germany invaded Yugoslavia, the initial response even of the Pierts', Mesitchs and Filipovitchs was to resist. Broz alone was silent . . . the Stalin-Hitler Pact, you see, had to be respected. Only after the German invasion of Russia did Broz even whisper the phrase 'national liberation'. When he finally did so, it was not in concert with the resistance movement itself, which he actually divided, but with a view toward establishing and imposing the same totalitarian apparatus on Yugoslavia that prevails in Russia.

It is a legend, assiduously fostered by Winston Churchill and others, that Broz aggressively fought and pushed back the Germans after 1941. When viewed concretely and objectively, this is false to the core. Markham, basing himself on the realities of the situation in Yugoslavia, sums up Broz's military activity as follows:

'The Partisans were not able to take and hold any vital point anywhere which the Germans wished to retain. In spite of the Partisans' terrible need for supplies and weapons and the readiness of the Allies to provide them, the Partisans were not able to occupy a single Adriatic harbour — except isolated uninhabited beaches for night landings. Even where the Partisans received excellent harbours as a gift they couldn't hold them. They could not keep open a single road from the coast to the interior. The Allies had to bring all supplies by air, and take out the wounded by air.' (p. 136.)

This situation prevailed up to the last days of the German occupation. Nonetheless, Broz had the gall to claim before world opinion that half of Yugoslavia had been liberated by his 'Partisans' during the war.

Despite pæans of praise for his energy against the Nazis, the story of Broz's inaction and passivity has still to be made well-known. In this connection we may again turn to the well-informed account of Markham:

'More important . . . the stable war front of the Partisans over against the Nazis shows how completely they accommodated themselves to the presence of German Armies. If one should carefully read Partisan war bulletins and draw a German-Partisan battle line at the end of each month he would discover that that line was practically the same for the full year preceding November, 1944. In almost all cases the same towns are mentioned and we find the Partisans repeatedly taking the same places they had already taken. They stood in one place. Their aim was to build up a military-political force for seizing power in Yugoslavia, and they didn't want to weaken it by fighting with Germans. Both sides were busy elsewhere and were glad to observe that unspoken truce.' (p. 153.)

The war crimes of Broz are derived from the brutal campaigns he waged against Yugoslav freedom. The victims of Broz are not simply to be numbered among the thousands of intellectuals and democrats he murdered during the Nazi occupation but also thousands of peasants who perished and are still dying at the hands of his so-called 'Partisans'. Whatever hopes the Yugoslav people entertained for independence and democracy during the last war have been drowned in a sea of blood. Yet this figure — Tito — is now the head of the Belgrade state and presumes to sit in judgement with his Pierts', Mesitchs, Filipovitchs and Leontitchs on Milorad Lukic and Mihailo Rajkovic — to demand their return to Yugoslavia as 'war criminals'.

How ironic can the jests of history be!

CORRESPONDENCE

On Anti-Semitism

Richmond,
SURREY.

16th January, 1952.

Sir,

I have just seen and read with considerable interest the winter issue of your journal, and wish to comment shortly on certain statements in the article by M. S. Shiloh, entitled "A Social Study of Genocide". There is much in this article with which I profoundly disagree. But I would only refer to two points which reveal, in my opinion, a wrong idea of Germany and of German history.

The article is, I take it, an attempt to explain the technique of genocide and to point out that Germany is not the only country that can be blamed for this horrible policy. But it contains many contradictions, and Mr. Shiloh's historical knowledge seems to be largely based on prejudice and not on that objectivity which is the basis of historical research. Thus on page 120, the author attempts to disprove the historical fact that the soldier, since the days of Frederick the Great, has always played the main rôle in German society and in German history. He admits the influence of militarism over the Middle Classes, but denies that it is a basic tradition and goes on to suggest that it was kept in check by the Labour Movement, which joined wholeheartedly in support of William I and his clique when war was declared in 1914. Again we are told that the weight attributed to anti-Semitism in Germany is greatly exaggerated. I challenge this statement *in toto*. The Germans have always been fundamentally anti-Semitic. Perhaps Mr. Shiloh will explain why a country which claimed to have "kultur", even as late as the late nineteenth century, in 1884, in 1891 and 1902, should attempt to stage ritual murder trials. How was it that though he pretends that among the broad masses of the German people anti-Semitism had practically no influence, not one professorship was given to a person who refused to be baptized, and that, in spite of his great eminence, Dr. Ehrlich, the man whose researches must have saved millions of lives, had to be content with a professorship in a Jewish institute. Perhaps Mr. Shiloh would explain why Ahlwardt, one of the worst slanderers of Jews, when at last tried for his anti-Semitic attacks upon the Jews received only a short prison sentence and to compensate for it, was elected to the Reichstag. And perhaps he has no knowledge of the Hep Hep campaign or ever heard of the Court Chaplain, Dr. Stöcker. It is common to-day among a certain school of thought to pretend that German anti-Semitism was the invention of Hitler and the Nazis. It would never, of course, have obtained the support it did if that were the case. Why did the great mass of the German people never raise their voice at the revolting campaign against Jewish citizens, including helpless children? Mr. Shiloh quotes as an authority the diaries of Dr. Goebbels, which were obviously edited for publication. Nothing can do greater injury to the cause of world peace than these

attempts to minimize and condone the evil ideology of a people who in the lifetime of most of us have been responsible for two world wars.

Yours faithfully,

"S."

Reply to Mr. S.

Mr. S. could make a case for anti-Semitism and militarism in Germany only by searching it out in areas where I am quite prepared to admit it existed. It was partly true in pre-Weimar Germany, but completely unimportant to anything I had to say, that Jews could not easily occupy professorial posts in German universities. But it hardly seems correct to say that this was a sentiment which existed among the German people. It is also true that the Court Chaplain and even the Court Eunuch of the Hohenzollerns, not to mention a large proportion of the ministerial bureaucracy, the Army, numerous political and industrial leaders, several Reichstag deputies, judges and similar scoundrels were anti-Semites. So where are we? Mr. S. advises me that these enemies of society, these parasites who hated the German people and who were bitterly hated by them . . . also hated the Jews! I regard this as a very favorable commentary on the weight of anti-Semitism among the masses. Indeed, I should be disturbed to learn that the succession of German governments over the past hundred years showed any favor to the Jews. It would be a product of social demoralization for the wolf to lie down beside the lamb and for the lamb to have any illusions about the matter.

Let us once and for all distinguish the German people from a succession of German governments which were imposed upon them. The people rose at least three times in a space of five years (1918-23), and were prepared again to rise between 1930-33 to free themselves of the camarilla that had been saddled on their shoulders. On each occasion they were either cruelly suppressed or betrayed. If the German government, army and bureaucracy exhausts Mr. S.'s familiarity with Germany or comprises his knowledge of the German social milieu, then it must be said at the outset that he is working with a very erroneous picture of the factors involved.

How does one judge the popularity of anti-Semitism anywhere: by divining its existence in the minds of cynical, official spokesmen? We know mass anti-Semitism existed in Poland because the daily contact of most Poles with most Jews was a source of daily friction. The two peoples were sufficiently separated from each other (although this was not true of everyone at all times) so that they spoke different languages. Is this at all true of Germany after she entered upon her bourgeois development? Indeed, I am reminded that German Jews who came to the United States after Hitler came to power were surprised to see how slender was the intimacy between Jews and non-Jews in the United States. This contrasted with their general experience in Germany, where the co-mingling of both peoples broke down many popular barriers that remain in America.

Let us observe in greater detail how the illustrations which Mr. S. submits to prove mass anti-Semitism in Germany can be employed, say, against France for similar ends:

1. Racial anti-Semitism as an ideology originates with Gobineau — a

Frenchman. Ergo: "France" first gave this sort of anti-Semitism to the world.

2. Perhaps the most sensational gesture against the Jews in Western Europe during the late nineteenth century was the Dreyfus Trial, a trial that aroused passions and sentiments incomparable in effect to the ritual murder trials in Germany. Ergo: "France" provides a demonstrative gesture of anti-Semitic behaviour.

3. The French aristocracy was militantly anti-Semitic. The Army generally obstructed the entry of Jews into higher military echelons and when they appeared there they felt the "burden" of their Jewish origin. The Jesuits and priesthood carried on a noisy agitation against the Jews. A number of French political organizations, all with high governmental and army connections, were programmatically anti-Semitic. Ergo: "France" provides lively illustrations of discrimination and hostility toward the Jews.

If Mr. S. chooses, I can readily "prove" to him on the strength of the type of evidence he submits that the German Jews were anti-Semitic — that they despised, discriminated and in their own way took measures against the Polish Jews who crossed the frontier from the East.

Conversely, using Mr. S.'s type of approach, one can show that the Jews were pre-eminently favored in pre-Hitler Germany, that many not only occupied high governmental posts but some "even" became professors (as, for example, M. A. Stern in 1859). Bamberger and Lasher, both Jews, were leading advisors of Bismarck in the earlier days of his career; Lasalle, a Jew, rose to be the head of the German workers' movement in the sixties of the last century; two of the six Social Democrats who were "Peoples' Commissars" in the Republic after the first World War were Jews (Haase and Landsberg); Preuss, a Jew, was given the major responsibility for preparing the Weimar Constitution; Kurt Eisner was the Premier of Bavaria in 1918; individuals of Jewish origin like Gradnauer, Hirsch and Rosenfeld were respectively Premiers of Saxony, Prussia and occupied the Ministry of Justice in Bavaria shortly after the first World War. Hilferding served twice as the German Minister of Finance in 1923 and 1928-9, and Rathenau, Foreign Minister in 1922, was the most important German "statesman" of the early 'twenties. Most of these men were Jews and it was well-known that all were of Jewish origin.

I do not think any of these facts prove anything for or against the importance of the Jews in German political life. I cite them merely to show that it is absurd to argue the existence of German anti-Semitism from instances such as ritual murder trials, the campaigns conducted by the Court Chaplain or the sentence received by Ahlwardt. These instances can be shown to exist everywhere. Like those cited either by Mr. S. or myself, they can be and have been employed to prove both sides of the argument — although neither side is strictly correct. The German people were neither anti-Semitic nor "pro-Semitic", and organizations existed to advance both "causes" without deciding the political development of Germany. The reason is obvious: the Jewish question did not enter into the problems of the mass of German people before Hitler forcibly pushed it before them, and it was not anti-Semitic feeling that decided Hitler's control of Germany. The Jewish question existed only for a fraction of the people — not, as in Eastern Europe, for the mass of the people. This fraction exists to one

degree or another in virtually every country in Western Europe and America. In Germany it was even smaller than the liberal demagogues care to admit. Certainly, it was not a mass phenomena which was felt in daily life, which seriously kept the Jews restricted, which even gave to German Jewry a defensive complexion with regard to the remainder of German social life. On the contrary, anti-Semitism was so very weak in Germany that specific Jewish qualities in the Jewish community had virtually disappeared and intermarriage between Jews and Gentiles was so considerable that German Jewry was well on the road to assimilation. The experience of daily life in Germany, especially the social position occupied by German Jews before Hitler, proves that Jews were almost entirely absorbed into the nation. This is the over-all fact, and it cannot be dismissed by what official spokesmen and reactionaries said and did.

A people cannot speak outside this day-to-day realm. They do not have a press, they do not have access to organs of expression, they cannot collect a mystical "mass consciousness" which debates or assumes responsibility for the sophistries of "pro-Semitism" and anti-Semitism. When the opportunities and objective bases for action present themselves, a people will act. When these are not present, especially after many mass actions have been betrayed or defeated, a people can bitterly adapt themselves to the prevailing conditions in order to ferret out new possibilities for action. When France, for example, was occupied by Hitler, who but a scoundrel and a De Gaulle would have demanded of the French people a suicidal and adventuristic assault against the German army? Rather, the people had to collect itself under the cloak of a Petain and await their opportunity when the military machine of German fascism weakened. Can we criticize the French people for this "acquiescence" and hold them responsible for the behaviour, words and actions of ex-Stalinists like Doriot? The same questions can be put for the German people. After terrible defeats, followed finally by the enormous betrayal of 1932-33 by the Social Democrats and Stalinists, the German people could do nothing. Indeed, they provided the most victims of fascism in the 'thirties. Not hundreds or thousands, but hundreds of thousands passed through Hitler's concentration camps. The people as a whole were regimented, terrorized and circumscribed, and finally sent off to wars in which millions of Germans perished. When, at last, the Nazi power began to totter, the Allied "liberators" deliberately traded in the Atlantic Pact for the Potsdam Agreement and took the pose of outright conquerors. The formulas of unconditional surrender, dismantling, strategic bombing and national annihilation, which rang through Allied propaganda toward the end of the war, closed all avenues to new mass actions. Yet in this entire period anti-Semitic propaganda by an entrenched fascist régime proved to be an admitted, a confessed, failure. The only anti-Semitic activity in Germany under Hitler — I say this categorically and challenge Mr. S. to give me one instance of popular anti-Semitic pogroms in Nazi Germany! — was the organized, coolly-planned product of select German fascists. The masses answered these actions with disgust, with silent, suppressed hostility. We can thank the Stalinists, Social-Democrats and Allies, who betrayed and delivered the German people to Hitler, for the fact that they could do little more.

What is even more decisive is the absence of an objective basis for mass

anti-Semitism in Germany. In Poland, for example, hostility to the Jews was fanned on a widespread scale by the economic rôle the Jews were forced to occupy. A large percentage of petty, transient tradesmen in Poland were Jews. They were compelled to endure their contact with the East European peasantry on the most difficult possible basis: as commercial traders who bought cheaply to sell dearly. In short, most of these social elements, reaching back to positions that are rooted more in mediævalism than in capitalism, were Jews and they were hated for reasons similar to the ones which existed in the Middle Ages. In Germany, on the other hand, the social complexion of commerce had radically changed. While it is true that close to half of German Jewry was engaged in commerce and banking, the character of these vocations assumed greater "respectability" and social prestige under advanced conditions of capitalism. The social position of the Jews in German commerce did not have the strictly parasitic or narrow appearance that it had in Poland. The Jews blended into the German petty bourgeoisie as a whole and they suffered its problems, antagonisms and fate in pre-Hitler Germany without the clear distinctiveness of the Polish Jews. Moreover, blurring this distinctiveness even more was the rise of the revolutionary movement, which guided the direction of German political life from provincial, village or national animosities to open conflicts with the bourgeoisie. All remaining possibilities for anything resembling popular anti-Semitism were thus absorbed by the struggle between the people and the bourgeoisie.

In all of this, of course, I do not deny that there was anti-Semitism in Germany. As I said in my article on genocide, its form varied over different periods to meet different needs. Mr. S. is hardly fair when he implies that I believe or claim anti-Semitism was invented by the Nazis. I was trying to give the problem the perspective it deserves. Surely Adolph Stöcker's Christian Socialist Party, for instance, did not have the same function as Hitler's S.S. In fact, it is by no means agreed that the C.S.P. was anti-Semitic on grounds comparable to those created by Lassen, Renan, Gobineau and Chamberlain. Stöcker directed his agitation against the Jews exclusively on economic and religio-cultural grounds. The struggle between the Christian Socialist Party and the Social-Democratic Party centered on whether the German labor movement would be tied to the Crown, an old device of the late European monarchies which found duplication in Czarist Russia (the Gapon movement). Other pre-World War I movements proved to be entirely farcical. The most ambitious attempt at political anti-Semitism was the Anti-Semitic Peoples Party, which collapsed because of internal bickering and a healthy neglect by the public. At its high-water mark in 1893 and 1907, it never succeeded in sending more than sixteen members to a Reichstag of 397. German socialism conclusively defeated this brand of anti-Semitism before the first World War.

As to German militarism: again I may ask Mr. S. to read my article with greater care. I did not say that "it was kept in check by the Labour Movement" but that "a strong labour movement was a powerful check on the usual excesses of a military aristocracy". However, I do not want to quibble over nuances. The labour movement was an effective counterforce for years to any attempt deeply to militarize German society. It could not eliminate militarism without also eliminating German imperialism — and that it

surely failed to do — but it did succeed in creating an active opposition to the intrusion of the military into civil life and limited these intrusions decisively. This is a fact, indeed so much of a fact that German civil liberties were less affected by the conduct of the first World War than proved to be the case with the Entente.

The German Social-Democratic Party, it is true, supported the war, but here Mr. S. confuses two different issues. Its support arose not from any complicity with German militarism but because of its economic interests in the *status quo*. The Social-Democratic Party's support of the war must be essentially ascribed to its progressive bureaucratization, its concern for its property, holdings and position. The war, of course, transformed the objective political and social situation in Germany, and it also brought the decay of the Social Democracy into the open. The result was that the Social Democratic leadership and the army grew to lean on each other. But by this time the issue of militarism had faded from the horizon, and it was not a cause for conspicuous popular interest. The German people were heartily disgusted with the war and with any prospect of a renewed militarization of German society.

I may conclude with the following cordial note of agreement: yes, the Goebbels Diaries were edited for publication. I suspect, however, that the omissions are not likely to favor a view that supports mass anti-Semitism or militarism in Germany. After all, the book was published with a view toward showing "a complete pattern for the genius of evil" (Book flap). It was hardly designed to oppose the propaganda line of the Allies on German "collective guilt", mass anti-Semitism, German militarism, etc.

M. S. Shiloh.

MATERIAL AND DOCUMENTS

GERMANY: THE CASE OF JOHANNES NEITZ

Ex-pastor Adalbert Knees who still serves his time in the British occupation prison at Werl (Germany) continues to take the part of the 'war criminals' imprisoned there. Through his sister, he asked us to call attention to the case of Johannes Neitz which he calls a 'Canadian error of justice'. We are all the more prepared to do so as this case is highly significant and of a general importance transcending the individual case.

Neitz was sentenced to life-long penal servitude by a Canadian court-martial held at Aurich (Germany) in March, 1946, but his penalty was reduced to twenty-one years in 1949. He was accused of the attempt to murder an airman who had been shot down. Neitz served as cook with a searchlight unit of a German naval coast battery. On 16th October, 1944, he was sent to a lighthouse in order to escort an enemy airman. For this purpose, his n.c.o. gave him a pistol and instructed him that it was his duty to shoot if the prisoner tried to escape. Neitz escorted his prisoner, Lieutenant R. Roman of the Canadian air force, to the mainland; when they arrived there, it appeared that the prisoner tried to escape. Neitz fired repeatedly, and one of his shots injured the prisoner lightly in the thigh. Neitz at once dressed his wound and called medical aid. Nevertheless, he was convicted for attempted murder.

If Neitz had had murderous intentions, it would have been natural for him to have carried them out in the vicinity of the deserted lighthouse. But no one who knows him thinks Neitz capable of such intentions. Above all, it is of the highest significance that Neitz had, only the night before, risked his own life in helping to save two other Canadian airmen who had come down in the marsh and were threatened by the incoming tide. However, it would appear that these two airmen cannot be found at present. It would also appear that nothing whatever could be done for the unjustly condemned Neitz: The British command in Wahnerheide declares itself not to be competent, since it was a Canadian court-martial which convicted Neitz, whilst the Canadian authorities also declare that they are not competent, since Neitz' sentence is served in a British prison. In view of this situation, we propose that the British prison officials, not being competent for people convicted by Canadians, should release Neitz, for clearly, the Canadian authorities, not being competent for people imprisoned by the British, would certainly have no objections.

Perhaps this logical proposal will succeed where the efforts of many others failed. For in contradistinction to the indifference with which the otherwise 'small fry' (that is to say, ranks below that of general) of the 'war criminals' is treated, Neitz has been championed, above all, by the authorities of his native town, Hamelin. Mr. Wilke, the town clerk, has sent us a detailed report of the case which supplements the information received through ex-pastor Knees, and according to which the German Foreign Office in Bonn has also intervened, — but so far without success. There is also Mr. Paul Wedekind (address: Mr. Paul Wedekind, 21 East 124th Street, New York 35, N.Y., U.S.A.), a German-American who has taken up Neitz' case and asks all those to write to him who want to protest against the injustice inflicted on Neitz. The innocent Johannes Neitz continues to languish in Werl prison nor, as was pointed out in letters from ex-pastor Knees which we published previously, is he by any means the only one. Yet every single case of an injustice concerns all those who are interested in the victory of justice. That is why we demand freedom for Johannes Neitz and revision of similar sentences against 'war criminals' of this kind!

LAMBS TO SLAUGHTER

Dr. Dalton . . . was reported to be so stricken that he threatened to leave politics and devote the rest of his life to the writing of his memoirs. Politics, he had discovered, was no place for honest men.

Observer, 16th March, 1952.

Mr. Bevan . . . spoke of one of Ministers' functions being to serve as public sacrifices, to accumulate a load of guilt which really belonged to the population as a whole, and then to have it expiated by their removal. "This is the way," he added, "in which democracy purges itself from time to time."

Manchester Guardian, 17th May, 1952.

r
t
,
d
e
it
d
d
e
e
,
t,
n,
e
n
d

y
e
e
e
nt
d
n
re
h
en
st
tz
rs
ns
no
m
s'

ve
cs,

as
he
nis
to

BACK NUMBERS OF CONTEMPORARY ISSUES

contain, amongst others, the following articles:

The Great Utopia—Plan for the organization of a World Democratic Movement	(No. 5)
Germany and World Development	Ernst Zander (No. 1)
War As A Way Out?	Ernst Zander (No. 7)
The War Against Russia as an Historical Necessity	Oscar Fischer (No. 8)
War as the Main Obstacle — Reply to Fischer	E. V. Swart (No. 8)
Korea: Strategy for Destruction	Andrew Maxwell (No. 8)
State Capitalism in Russia	M. S. Shiloh (No. 7)
South Africa's Trek From Progress	David Kemp (No. 3)
Humanity's Resources and the New Malthusianism	Stephen D. Banner (No. 3)
British Development and the Common Illusion	Geoffrey Quilter (No. 2)
The Cold War and the Hydrogen Bomb	Ray Jackson (No. 9)
Occupied Japan: The Policy of Annihilation in the Far East	David Kemp (No. 10)
A Social Study of Genocide	M. S. Shiloh (No. 10)
Persian Oil: America Defeats Britain	Andrew Maxwell (No. 11)
Crime and Competition in America	Thomas Cranmer (No. 11)
Aspects of American Militarism	Ray Jackson (No. 1)
John Dewey and the Peculiar Traits of American Thought	A. E. Bain (Nos. 1 & 2)
T. S. Eliot as Critic: Outline for a Critical Approach	S. J. Wyndham (No. 2)
Interim Balance Sheet: The Bankruptcy of Power Politics	Ernst Zander (No. 4)
Industrial Monopoly Capitalism	Nathan Davidson (No. 5)
The Bankruptcy of "Apartheid"	David Kemp (No. 6)
America's Garrison Economy	Nathan Davidson (No. 11)

Obtainable from bookshops or direct from the publishers

CONTEMPORARY ISSUES can be obtained from:

Contemporary Press, 26 Heber Road, London, N.W.2

Wm. Dawson & Sons Ltd., Cannon House, Macklin Street, London, W.C.2

B. F. Stevens & Brown Ltd., 28-30 Little Russell Street, London, W.C.1.

Edw. Allen & Son, 10-12-14 Grape Street, Shaftesbury Avenue, London, W.C.2.

Gordon & Gotch Ltd., 75 Farringdon Street, London, E.C.4.

Oxford Street Bookshop, 397 Oxford Street, London, W.1

Bowes & Bowes Ltd., 172 Trinity Street, Cambridge

Weatherhead's, Market Square, Cambridge

B. H. Blackwell Ltd., 48-51 Broad Street, Oxford

Andrew Elliott, 17 Princes Street, Edinburgh

T. & G. Allen Ltd., Blackett Street, Newcastle-on-Tyne

U.S.A. AND CANADA

Contemporary Press, 545 Fifth Avenue, N.Y.C. 17, New York

ARGENTINA

Mitchell's English Book Store, Cangallo 570, Buenos Aires

DENMARK

Einar Munksgaard, Norregarde 6, Copenhagen

EIRE

Eason & Son Ltd., 79-82 Middle Abbey Street, Dublin

Dublin Wholesale News Agency, 74 Middle Abbey Street, Dublin

Burns, Oates & Washbourne Ltd., 21/22 D'Olier Street, Dublin

FINLAND

Akateminen Kirjakauppa, Helsinki

FRANCE

Galignani, 224 Rue de Rivoli, Paris 1er

Messageries Dawson, 4 Faubourg Poissoniere, Paris Xeme

La Concorde, 240 Rue de Rivoli, Paris 1er

Librairie du Pantheon, 49 Bd. Saint Germain, Paris Veme

GERMANY

Gerhard Hänsel, Köln-Kalk, Vietonstr., 16/18

HOLLAND

Meulenhoff & Co. N.V., Beulingstraat 2-4, Amsterdam-C.

N.V. Martinus Nijhoff's Boekhandel, Lange Voorhout 9, 's-Gravenhage

INDIA

Bhawnani & Sons, Connaught Place, New Delhi

NORWAY

J. W. Cappelen, Kirkegt., 15, Oslo

Cammermeyers Boghandel, Karl Johansgt., 41 & 43 Oslo

SOUTH AFRICA

Central News Agency, Commissioner Street, Johannesburg, and all branches

SWEDEN

A/B Sandbergs Bokhandel, Sturdgatan, 8, Stockholm

C. E. Fritze, Fredsgatan, 2, Stockholm

AUSTRALIA

E. F. G. Bookshop, 28 Martin Place, Sydney, N.S.W.

University Bookshop, Hackett Hall, Crawley, W.A.

Alberts Bookshop Pty. Ltd., 14-22 Forrest Place, Perth, W.A.

Oldham, Beddome & Meredith Pty. Ltd., 36 Elizabeth Street, Hobart, Tasmania

Robertson & Mullens Ltd., 107-113 Elizabeth Street, Melbourne, Victoria

Argonaut Bookshop, 224-225 North Terrace, Adelaide, S.A.

Published by Contemporary Press, 26 Heber Road, London, N.W.2, and

Printed by Kenion Press Ltd., 216 High Street, Slough, Bucks.

